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Abstract
This thesis broadly consists of three essays examining the impact of institutions on firm
R&D, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activity, and economic growth. The focus of each
paper is unique in its contribution. The first chapter examines the evolving role of domestic
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in the context of increasing globalization, where the
R&D incentives of firms are framed not only by the IPR regime in their home country, but
also by the IPR in its export markets. This paper first reviews the literature related to the
classical relationship between IPR and innovation. Contributing to the growing literature,
this paper exploits the exogenous variation in partner IPR as a mechanism to interpret
the causal impact of IPR on private sector R&D investments. By merging datasets on
R&D, production, trade, and IPR to construct an export-weighted index of trade partner
IPR by country-industry-year, this paper explores whether firms respond to trade partner
IPR. After including numerous controls as well as industry, year, and country fixed effects,
the results of this essay suggest a positive relationship between domestic IPR and private
sector R&D. Similarly, the results also suggest that there is a positive and significant
relationship between export partner IPR and domestic R&D activity. These results are
further confirmed when constructing a firm-level export-weighted index of trade partner
IPR from a unique Canadian firm-level export dataset. The results not only suggest a
causal link between IPR and firm R&D, they also highlight the need to consider domestic
IPR policy as but one piece of the IPR regime that firms face.
The second chapter assesses the impact of democratization on corresponding economic
growth. It is important as it is undeniable that political institutions, the quality of bu-
reaucracy, mode of governance and an efficient rule of law should have a direct effect on
per capita income and economic growth. The essay first reviews the academic literature
related to democracy and economic growth, while discussing the characteristics associated
with both democratic and non-democratic regimes. The analysis begins by employing an
annual panel data consisting of 43 developing economies in Africa, Latin America, and
Asia between 1970 and 1999. The results in this essay suggest that countries moving to-
wards democracy experience lower levels of economic growth. These findings are robust
across OLS, fixed effects, and IV estimates. More importantly, a more thorough analysis
indicates that an over investment in public goods from democratic regimes may be driving
these results. Furthermore, this research is the first to offer empirical evidence on the
magnitude of differential effects that the type of governance has - whether a democracy or
dictatorship - on country specific economic growth.
Lastly, the final chapter examines the locational choices of multinational firms in the
presence of political risk. Following a real options approach, the results suggest that the
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vertical integration strategy of firms divest from institutional uncertainty, while government
officials combat domestic country risk by providing overly generous incentive packages to
attract foreign investors. Furthermore, through a numerical example, our results suggest
that tax credits may be a more suitable method to attract FDI, as FDI not only tends to
respond more to changes in tax credits than investment subsidies, but it is also significantly
less costly for the host government to implement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The role of incentives is central to the study of economics. The ability to influence be-
haviour through effective policy is crucial for economies to prosper. More so, the economic
framework of institutions is instrumental in maximizing social welfare. This thesis exam-
ines the impact of economic and political institutions on their evolving role in incentivizing
private sector R&D, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and promoting economic
growth. Each chapter of this thesis carefully explores the social impact of such political
and economic institutions, where good governance is essential for countries to successfully
integrate into today’s world economy and help alleviate global poverty.
The legal system helps support a healthy competitive business environment. In the
context of this thesis, we refer to the institutional support through strong enforcement
mechanisms in intellectual property (IP) law that encourages innovators to continue to in-
vest in Research & Development (R&D). In the case of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR),
it has long been recognized that while IPR mechanisms generate a temporary monopoly
to the innovator, there is also the added benefit for innovators to secure a future stream
of profits. Therefore, a strong IPR system creates a diffusion of knowledge by encouraging
firms to innovate.
The benefits arising from a strong IPR framework have been identified as one of the
main drivers of economic growth in the EU. A 2013 report by the European Patent Office
confirm that during 2008-2010, R&D intensive industries accounted for 89% of the EUs
total trade but only 72% of the trade deficit, indicating a positive contribution to the trade
balance. Furthermore, IPR-intensive industries in the EU have generated 26% of all jobs
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while contributing 39% of GDP.1
As technological innovation is arguably a precursor to job creation, export growth,
and economic activity, there is a growing need to understand the incentives of firms to
ensure their continued investment in R&D. While the general consensus of economists is
that some property right protection may be welfare enhancing, the empirical literature has
yet to discover conclusive evidence linking IPR and innovation. In some instances where
empirical results have found a positive correlation between IPR and innovation, the results
may not necessarily be interpreted as causal. It may be the case that R&D intensive firms
lobby the government to strengthen IPR. Alternatively, it may be the case that policy
makers put in place a level of IPR to match the level of R&D activity in the country.
The aim of the first chapter is to empirically investigate the causal impact of IPR
on R&D activity by exploiting export-partner IPR as a source of exogenous variation.
Particularly, the results in this chapter find evidence of alternative channels to promote
R&D investment, where domestic R&D responds positively not only to domestic IPR,
but also the IPR of its export-partner. These results not only justify the inclusion of
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement into the
WTO mandate, but also highlight the need to consider an IPR regime in a globalized
environment.
While promoting IPR (and in particular, promoting the harmonization of IPR globally)
is one of many channels policy makers can choose to spur economic growth, there are other
initiatives a country can take to improve its level of economic development. For exam-
ple, a large body of literature in political science and economics has studied the empirical
linkages between political regime types and economic outcomes. In particular, over the
past thirty years there has been a global shift towards more democratic regimes. While
democratic regimes stress the importance of a representative institution where redistribu-
tive policies are beneficial to the masses, the end result may not necessarily be welfare
enhancing. In terms of GDP per capita, while some evidence has shown that democracy
fosters economic activity through lower political instability and output volatility, there is
equally supporting evidence of democracies being associated with low private investment
and high government spending, which in turn hinder economic activity.2 Moreover, any
1The positive outcome of IPR reforms on innovation and growth has also been documented in prior
studies. For example, a 2012 report by the United States Patent and Trademark Office show that in 2010,
IPR intensive industries in the United States have generated almost a fifth of all jobs while contributing
35% to GDP. This has also created a wage premium of 42% over non-R&D-intensive industries.
2Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)
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potential positive relationship between democracy and economic growth may be attributed
to reverse causality. Papers as early as Lipset (1959) points out that wealthier countries
tend to be more democratic, as wealth is a sign of modernization.
The second chapter of this thesis attempts to measure the impact of political institu-
tions on per capita income by instrumenting democracy with various classification measures
of political regime types. We argue that political regimes that are associated with more
democratic features are more likely to implement welfare enhancing policies to the masses,
which would directly impact per capita income. By employing an unbalanced panel consist-
ing of 43 developing countries for a period between 1970 and 1999, we find that countries
with democratic characteristics are associated with approximately 10% to 12% in lower
levels of per capita income. Further analysis suggests that countries with democratic insti-
tutions are correlated with higher incidences in public goods. These results may provide
mild (albeit weak) evidence to support previous theories that democratic regimes tend to
overinvest in public goods at the expense of more favourable social choices, which may lead
to a decline in per capita.
While the type of political regime may have a direct impact on economic activity, the
political and social infrastructure of the country may also play an important role towards
fostering economic activity. For example, while both the supply side (labor skill and cost)
and demand side (market size) of a host country attract foreign capital, the quality of the
legal, political, and institutional environment also plays a significant role in the amount
of FDI a country receives. Furthermore, the host country also benefits from the inflow of
foreign capital. These benefits include, but are not limited to, job creation and human
capital formation, increased market competition, and technological spillovers.
However, while government effectiveness and an efficient judicial system help firms more
easily set up in the host country, excessive bureaucracy and delays have the opposite effect.
More so, a poor institutional environment where informal modes of governance are present,
corruption, either through bribes, extortion, or other illegal methods of market distortion,
may be rampant. This creates strong investment barriers to foreigners and nationals alike,
as there is now an additional cost to consider. Furthermore, poor institutional quality
may also be associated with political and institutional instability, where staged coups, civil
wars, or more generally, internal conflicts, impact the flows of FDI.
The aim of the last chapter is to closely examine the impact of the socio-institutional
environment on the firms decision to pursue FDI. Specifically, the impact of institutional
uncertainty on FDI is analyzed from the perspective of the firm, the host country, and
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the home country. Not only do we derive optimal investment conditions for the firm to
switch production abroad, but we also derive infrastructure subsidies and tax credits that
potential host countries can implement to combat its own unfavourable environment and
continue to attract FDI. We further investigate the effect of FDI on the tax base from the
home country.
By implementing a real options approach to model FDI behaviour, the results from
the first chapter are consistent with the empirical findings that political risk negatively
impacts FDI inflows. Furthermore, the first chapter also finds that the size of the subsidy
is considerably large relative to the case when institutional uncertainty is absent. The
results from this chapter further suggest that tax credits may be a more favourable method
to attract FDI, as firms not only respond more to tax credits than infrastructure subsidies,
the cost to implement the tax credits makes it a more favourable choice for host countries.
This could partially explain the vast literature in tax competition and FDI.
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Chapter 2
Intellectual Property Rights and
Firm R&D in a Globalized World
2.1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) are among the key institutions that influence private
innovative activity. They allow firms to appropriate their creations, thereby providing
increased incentive to innovate. Given the importance of IPR in an increasingly knowledge-
based economy, it is perhaps not surprising that IPR regimes have been strengthened
across the globe. Yet IPR, and patent protection in particular, are coming under increased
criticism amid speculation that, in their current form, they may be stifling innovation
(Jaffe and Lerner (2011)). This paper empirically examines this relationship between IPR
and private sector R&D, using partner country IPR as an exogenous source of variation to
establish a causal relationship.
The use of IPR as a means of inducing private sector innovation dates back to at least
1474 when Venice introduced the first formal patent code (Granstrand (2005)). Patent
protection thereafter spread quickly within Europe, at times generating controversy. But
it is not until recently that patent protection became the subject of strong and widespread
criticism, from industry, academia, and government. For example, Hall (2007) cites nu-
merous reports by firms, governments, and quasi-government agencies that call for patent
and IPR reform. This increased controversy around patent protection, coincides with, or
is the result of, a significant increase in protection towards the end of the 20th century,
an era dubbed the pro-patent era. Over this period, stronger enforcement of ever-broader
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IPR were instituted, and strong IPR regimes spread globally through such agreements as
the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). And this, despite the
fact that there is no consensus around the relative merits of strong IPR.
The case for patent protection begins with the understanding that innovation and
knowledge are unlike other goods. Innovations are non-rival and only partially excludable.
To the extent that the knowledge underlying an innovation is a public good, innovation
will be underprovided by the market due to a positive information externality. Patent
protection seeks to address this problem by allowing inventors to exclude others from
using the innovation for a period of time. The theoretical literature on optimal patent
protection has long recognized that a policy of stronger IPR trades off static welfare losses
(due to the temporary monopoly) with dynamic welfare gains (due to increased incentives
for innovation) (Arrow (1962); Nordhaus (1969)).1 Crucially, then, any argument in favor of
stronger IPR rests on the case that it will result in a significantly higher level of innovation.
Yet the empirical evidence in this regard remains mixed. In a survey of U.S. patent
reforms and their impact on innovation, Jaffe (2000) concludes that there is little empirical
evidence to support the theory that stronger IPR increases innovation. Ginarte and Park
(1997) examine a panel of countries and find that the strength of a country’s IPR is
positively correlated with R&D, though only for developed countries. Kanwar and Evenson
(2003) and Allred and Park (2007), using a similar methodology to that of Ginarte and
Park (1997), also find a positive correlation between a countrys IPR and R&D. However,
in a paper that exploits the 1988 expansion of patent scope in Japan, Sakakibara and
Branstetter (1999) find no effect of stronger patent protection on R&D. And focusing on
the pharmaceutical industry, Qian (2007) finds that stronger IPR do not increase the R&D
of firms, except at higher levels of economic development, and then only up to a point.
A concern common to all of the above papers is the possibility of an omitted variable
bias that could account for some of the positive findings. For example, the correlation be-
tween IPR and R&D could arise because firms that expect to ramp up R&D expenditures
lobby the government for increased IPR so as to better protect their investment. Alter-
natively, governments may enact stronger IPR protection in response to some expectation
of increased domestic R&D. Qian (2007) partially addresses such scenarios by employing
a nonparametric matching method that controls for some of the covariates that could be
associated with a country’s innovative potential.
1More recent models examine situations where innovation is cumulative and/or complementary (Green
and Scotchmer (1995);Lemley and Shapiro (2006); Bessen and Maskin (2009)). In such cases, patent
protection could result in lower rates of innovation due to such issues as holdup and coordination problems.
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In this paper we propose to address endogeneity using the IPR regime of a country’s
trade partner as an exogenous source of variation. The premise is that a firm that is
considering whether to undertake the development of a new product, compares the costs of
R&D with the expected profit stream that the product is to earn, not just domestically, but
also in foreign markets. To the extent that the firm will enjoy stronger patent protection
in its export markets, the firm has a greater expected foreign income stream associated
with the innovation, and will therefore have a stronger incentive to perform R&D.
We test whether R&D responds to the IPR regime of export markets by constructing
an export-weighted foreign IPR measure. In section 2.2, we construct this variable at
the country/industry/year level for a sample of 20 countries. Controlling for numerous
covariates, as well as country, industry, and year fixed effects, we find unambiguous evidence
that R&D responds not only to the domestic IPR regime, but also to the IPR regime in
its export markets. The latter result, since it is not subject to the same concerns of
endogeneity, provides strong evidence that firms do indeed perform more R&D in response
to stronger IPR. Notwithstanding, we do find that there are diminishing returns to stronger
IPR in terms of its positive impact on R&D. In section 2.4, we perform a similar analysis on
a sample of Canadian export-oriented firms, constructing the export partner IPR measure
at the firm/industry/year level, and obtain almost identical results.
While the primary contribution of this paper is to use foreign IPR as an exogenous
source of variation to show that private sector R&D responds to the IPR regime, the rela-
tionship between domestic R&D and trade partner IPR is also interesting in and of itself,
and constitutes a second contribution of this paper. There is a significant theoretical liter-
ature addressing the topic, primarily within the context of a North-South model (Helpman
(1992);Lai (1998); Glass and Saggi (2002);Branstetter and Saggi (2011) ; Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010) ). Although for the most part these models predict a positive relation-
ship between Northern innovation and Southern IPR, the result depends on the channel
that is being examined and the particulars of the model. For example, Glass and Saggi
(2002) find that stronger foreign IPR results in imitation being more difficult, which leads
to resource wasting, lower levels of FDI, and reduced domestic innovation.
In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical work in this area is in its relative
infancy. In perhaps the first empirical paper examining how innovation responds to foreign
IPR, Qiu and Yu (2010) find that U.S. patenting rates increased in response to the imple-
mentation of the TRIPS Agreement. However, they do not find U.S. patenting rates to be
affected by the strengthening of patent protection by individual or small groups of coun-
tries. While these are important findings, the use of patents as a measure of innovation
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could potentially be problematic in this context. For instance, the findings are consis-
tent with U.S. firms responding to stronger global IPR, not by increasing innovation, but
by maintaining the same level of innovation and switching to protecting their intellectual
property through patents instead of through other means. Hence, it would seem that for
the purpose of analyzing the relationship between innovation and IPR, R&D expenditures
(an input measure of innovation) would be a more appropriate measure.
Most recently, in a paper employing a related methodology to this one, Park (2012)
examines whether Southern intellectual property rights affect Northern innovation using
a micro-database of U.S. multinationals and their foreign affiliates. He finds that the
R&D expenditures of these U.S. firms do not respond significantly to the level of IPR in
developing countries, instead responding to the level of IPR in other developed countries.
To arrive at this result, he separately constructs a trade-weighted index of foreign IPR for
developing and developed partner countries, using the U.S. national share of exports to
any particular country as weights (because firm-level exports were unobserved).
Relative to Park (2012), our paper has a different focus in that foreign IPR are used as
an exogenous source of variation to establish a causal relationship between IPR and R&D.
In addition, our data allows us to use a more robust methodology. We merge private sector
R&D, production, and trade data, at the level of a country-industry-year for 20 countries,
45 industries, and for the years 1988 to 2005. We examine the relationship between private
sector R&D and the export-weighted foreign IPR regime, both of which vary by country,
industry, and year. As such, our methodology, which includes numerous controls as well
as country, industry, and year fixed effects, allows us to identify the relationship based
on differences across countries, industries, and time. For example, we find that otherwise
similar industries in the same country perform different levels of R&D as a function of
having exports that are tilted towards different markets with different levels of IPR. We
also address the potential issue of endogeneity in the choice of export partners (and hence
of the export-weighted foreign IPR measure) by fixing the country/industry export shares
at pre-sample levels. In addition, we repeat our analysis on a micro-dataset of Canadian
firms and find almost identical results, concluding that, indeed, firms perform more R&D
in response to stronger IPR.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses our primary
dataset, methodology, and presents summary statistics. Section 2.3 presents and discusses
our empirical results for the full sample of countries. Section 2.4 discusses our micro-
dataset of Canadian firms, discusses our methodology, and presents our results for that
analysis. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Dataset and Empirical Design
To examine the impact of export partner IPR on domestic innovation, we will be using
business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD) by industry for 20 countries. The dataset
is from the OECD Main Science & Technology Indicators (MSTI) database. The data are
from 1987 to 2005, where the industry classifications are defined by 2 and 4 digit ISIC
rev. 3. Due to confidentiality issues, national statistical regulations prevent publication of
R&D activity for industries where there are very few firms. Therefore, this database is the
limiting factor that creates our unbalanced panel.
To calculate R&D intensity by industry, country, and year, we use the UNIDO Industrial
Statistics database for production measured as value added output. The data is at both
the 2 and 4 digit ISIC rev. 3 from 1988-2005.
To calculate the export-weighted index of trade partner IPR, we use trade data from
the UN Comtrade database at the 2 and 4-digit SITC Rev. 3. A concordance from SITC
rev 3 to ISIC rev 3 from the United Nations is used to match the data accordingly.
The measure of IPR that will be used in this paper is the patent protection index
developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and updated in Park (2008). The IPR index provides
scores for 122 countries between the years 1960 to 2010. To ensure IPR can be compared
across country and time, the strength of national patent rights is measured through the
aggregate score of five factors:
1. Membership in international treaties
2. Coverage
3. Enforcement Mechanisms
4. Loss of Rights
5. Duration
Each factor has a value ranging between 0 and 1, for an aggregate score ranging between
0 (weakest) to 5 (strongest). As IPR scores change slowly over time, Park (2008) evaluates
IPR for each country at every 5 year interval. For a more extensive review of the creation
of this index, please refer to the appendix.
The export-weighted IPR (EIPR) index is constructed as the weighted average of the
export partners IPR by using the proportion of exports for each industry, country, and
9
time period, as weights. Or more formally, if I define Xijkt as the exports for country i at
time t in industry k exporting to country j, where j = 1...J , and Σj 6=iXijkt as the total
exports to j countries, then:
EIPRikt =
J∑
j 6=i
Xijkt ∗ IPRjt
Σj 6=iXijkt
(2.1)
Therefore, equation 2.1 is a function of two components that vary over time: the
dynamic trade flows and the IPR regime of the export country. Similar to Park (2012),
the construction of our index may be endogenous as exports may be flowing to countries
with characteristics that are highly correlated with patent protection levels (ie economic
development).2 Or more generally, the dynamics of exports may be flowing to countries that
have characteristics that are completely unrelated to IPR. Here we refer to the variables that
are typically associated with the gravity model of trade: geographical distance, cultural
similarity, size of markets, etc. To ensure we do not capture other factors in our index
presented in equation 2.1, we propose to construct an export-weighted IPR index using
fixed trade flows from one year before our sample begins. The reasoning to implement
this method is quite straight forward. The proportion of exports prior to our sample
size should theoretically capture all the proposed factors that affect trade flows between
countries. Therefore, in our sample size, with a fixed trade flow, any changes to the index
over time will be due to changes in the partner IPR and not changes in trade flows. As
IPR move slowly over time, we use 5 year intervals for our data set; specifically we use the
years, 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Therefore, we can rewrite equation 2.1 as:
FEIPRikt =
J∑
j 6=i
Xijk87 ∗ IPRjt
Σj 6=iXijk87
(2.2)
It may be reasonable to assume that domestic R&D intensity does not respond imme-
diately to changes in export partner IPR. To account for any lags, we calculate the forward
average of R&D intensity. For example, the 1990 value of R&D intensity would represent
the average R&D intensity for the years between 1990 and 1994, inclusive.3
2This can be seen in table 3 of the Appendix. The average IPR score is correlated with each countries
income classification level.
3For the year 1988, we use the average R&D intensity values for the years 1988 and 1989. As the R&D
dataset is highly unbalanced, we decided to include the 1988 data to increase the amount of observations
in our final dataset. If we restrict our sample for data between 1990 and 2005, the results presented in
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The final dataset is comprised of 20 countries across 45 manufacturing sectors for the
years 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. The unbalanced dataset has a total of 1474
observations.
There are several important considerations related to the creation of the R&D intensity
and partner IPR measure. First, production data may be misallocated across industries,
which would either over or underestimate the true output and thereby over or underesti-
mate R&D intensity. Secondly, there could be discrepancies between the year of production
of the good and the year it was exported. It may be that a good was produced one year
and exported the following year. Lastly, some countries in our sample may only report
production in the formal economy, where the informal sector of a country may be vast.
We should further note that while this paper examines the impact of patent protection
on R&D activity for manufacturing industries only, the results presented in this section do
not necessarily imply that these industries will respond more to IPR for product patents
than process patents. In fact, the IPR measure used in this paper does not distinguish
between product or process patents, as they are virtually synonymous. For instance, the
TRIPS agreements state that a process patent protection must give rights not only over
use of the process but also over products obtained directly by the process. Thus, as
manufacturing firms typically patent either the process to produce the product or the
product itself, the results presented here can be interpreted as the impact of general patent
protection levels on private sector R&D activity4.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 below provides descriptive statistics of the variables of interest and the control
variables used in this study, whereas table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix between our
main variables of interest. Lastly, table 4 and 5 in the appendix list the 20 OECD coun-
tries and the 45 manufacturing industries in our sample. As expected, table 2.1 indicates
that the average domestic IPR score is relatively high for our sample size of 20 OECD
countries. As table 2.2 shows that our measures of trade partner IPR are positively cor-
related, irrespective of which measure of export partner IPR we use, the average mean
this section are still robust to the exclusion of the 1988 data. For consistency, forward averages were also
calculated for each control variable.
4The analysis can be extended also to service based industries that pursue R&D activity. For example,
the mining and quarrying industry may invest in R&D to develop a more efficient extraction technique,
which may lead to inventing a new device. Therefore, the firm would patent both the process and the
device.
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value of both partner IPR scores reflect the trade flows from the 45 industries across 20
countries. Specifically we see that exports are flowing towards countries that are correlated
with relatively high IPR scores (ie among developed countries).
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: R&D Intensity and IPR
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln( R&D Intensity ) 1472 -5.365 2.802 -13.647 0.140
IPR 1472 3.961 0.671 1.66 4.88
EIPR 1472 4.010 0.443 0.933 4.843
FEIPR 1472 4.068 0.508 1.620 4.851
Control Variables
Trade Openness 1472 0.905 5.337 0.0001 194.2219
Export Partner GDP per Capita 1472 24171.63 7741.35 2722.093 55854.26
Government Expenditure 1472 19.55833 4.061863 10.29273 27.81523
Education 1472 5.329647 1.15308 3.04419 7.99846
Table 2.2: Correlation Matrix: Dynamic Partner IPR and Fixed Partner IPR- Industry
Level
EIPR FEIPR
EIPR 1
FEIPR 0.6763 1
More importantly, figure 1 in the appendix below confirms that irrespective of which
measure of partner IPR is used, stronger partner IPR is associated with high levels of pri-
vate sector R&D, whereas figure 2 in the appendix further suggests the positive relationship
between R&D intensity and domestic levels of patent protection.
The control variables introduced in this paper vary at the country-year and industry-
country-year level. At the industry-country-level, we created a measure of trade openness,
which is calculated as the ratio of total exports to total production output. It can be
argued that the trade orientation of specific industries and countries can be an important
determinant in the propensity to innovate. It may be that relatively open economies, or
industries located in relatively open economies, face more competition, and are thus more
likely to invest into R&D to remain competitive. While this measure of trade openness is
not quite precise due to issues relating to matching production output and exports (as can
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be seen by the maximum value), it is still a reasonable measure to further analyze how
relatively open and closed R&D intensive economies react to changes in partner IPR.
A growing concern when measuring the impact of IPR on innovation is that the IPR
index may be highly correlated with the level of economic development of the respective
country. As we are capturing the relationship between IPR and innovation through partner
IPR, we also calculate the fixed export weighted index of partner GDP per capita as
a control variable. This is to ensure that the estimated coefficient when regressing R&D
intensity on partner IPR is not biased by capturing other factors that are positively related
to the IPR index. As we see in table 2.1, the average partner GDP per capita is relatively
high at $24,171.63, indicating that exports tend to flow towards relatively rich countries.
Other standard country-year control variables include total government expenditure (as
a % of GDP) and human capital, expressed as the total enrollment in tertiary education as
a % of the population. These control variables are used primarily to provide a reasonable
estimation on the effect of domestic IPR on R&D intensity. While the estimate of domestic
IPR may be endogenous, it may still provide some insightful results as to the degree of
responsiveness of R&D investments on domestic patent protection.
2.3 Empirical Estimation
To examine the relationship between partner IPR and R&D intensity, the econometric
model will take the following form:
Log(
R&D
Output
)ikt = β1IPRit + β2EIPRikt + X
′
i,tΓ + ιi + ηk + νt + ikt (2.3)
Where β1 represents the degree of responsiveness of innovation to domestic IPR and β2
measures the degree of responsiveness of domestic innovation to export partners IPR5. X′i,tΓ
represents the control variables presented in table 2.1, whereas νt are the year dummies
that pick up unobservable changes that directly affect R&D intensity over time. ηk account
for the industry specific unobservable characteristics that directly affect R&D intensity,
5We must take careful consideration when interpreting the results from estimating equation 2.3. For
example, while we argue that β2 is exogenous, β1 is still a biased estimator due to reverse causality, which
in turn, also impacts the precision of our other estimated coefficients, namely β2. While we cannot drop
IPR as a covariate (as we would be trading off a simultaneity bias for an omitted variable bias), this paper
is more concerned with the expected sign of β1 and β2.
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whereas ιi represents the time-consistent country fixed effects. For simpler interpretation,
a logarithmic transformation to both domestic and export partner IPR is applied. Table
2.3 presents the results of estimating equation 2.3. Table 2.3 also estimates the impact of
IPR on R&D intensity for industries that are both relatively open and close. We define an
open industry if it exports more than 50% of its production. This is calculated using the
trade openness variable.
Table 2.3: OLS Estimates: Impact of IPR on R&D Investments
Full Sample Open Industries Closed Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Ln(IPR) 1.631∗∗∗ 3.668∗∗∗ 3.327∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.798 1.069∗∗
(0.309) (0.375) (0.352) (0.299) (0.540) (0.454)
Ln(EIPR) -0.408 2.748∗∗∗ 2.296∗∗ 0.123 0.136 -0.128
(0.814) (0.937) (0.914) (0.364) (0.610) (0.441)
Panel B
Ln(IPR) 1.565∗∗∗ 3.990∗∗∗ 3.640∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.719 1.141∗∗
(0.312) (0.382) (0.362) (0.297) (0.522) (0.454)
Ln(FEIPR) 0.958 5.618∗∗∗ 5.238∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗ 0.498
(0.783) (0.970) (0.915) (0.472) (0.964) (0.557)
Observations 1472 1472 1472 1472 682 790
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors correcting for het-
eroskedasticity. Sample size consists of 20 countries
across 45 industries for the years 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000,
and 2005.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Column (1) presents the regression with domestic IPR, export partner IPR, and the
set of control variables as regressors only. Column (2) adds in year fixed effects, whereas
column (3) adds in year and industry fixed effects. Lastly, column (4) is the fully specified
model by including the set of control variables, year, industry, and country fixed effects.
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Panel A presents the results for our biased measure of partner IPR, whereas Panel B
presents the results for the corrected measure of partner IPR. For instance, by adding the
year fixed effects to the model, our variable of interest presented in Panel B, Ln(FEIPR),
changes from a statistically insignificant coefficient to a large, positive, and significant
coefficient. By incorporating the year fixed effects into the model, it now identifies the
downward-trend of R&D intensity over time. Furthermore, by shifting focus from column
(2) to (3) and incorporating industry fixed effects, we see that the magnitude of our es-
timated coefficient has decreased slightly, while still significant at the 1% level. This can
be reasonably expected. As the manufacturing industries in our sample have varying de-
grees of innovative capacities, some industries rely heavily on R&D activities and patent
protection to maintain its global competitiveness.
After controlling for year, industry, and country fixed effects, our results presented in
column (4) suggest that export partner IPR still maintains a positive and significant effect
on domestic innovation. Specifically, we see that a 1% increase in export-partner IPR is
associated with a 1.4% increase in domestic innovation. This relationship is statistically
significant at the 1% level. While we observe that the degree of responsiveness of domestic
R&D intensity to export partner IPR is not as large as the results presented in column
(3), by incorporating country-fixed effects we capture the unobservable country factors
that directly affect R&D spending of firms. It is reasonable to assume that time-invariant
country factors such as the legal institution of the countries play a significant role in
promoting R&D activities. This also holds true when analysing the impact of domestic
IPR (measured by the variable IPR) on domestic innovation. The effect is still positive
and statistically significant, but the magnitude of the impact has been reduced significantly
when moving from column (3) to column (4).
Similarly, the results presented in Panel A show a positive (but statistically insignif-
icant) relationship between the endogenous measure of partner IPR and R&D activity.
While the estimated coefficient remains positive in the fully specified model, given the
results in Rafiquzzaman (2002), we would expect that Ln(EIPR) to be biased upwards.
Specifically, we hypothesized that R&D intensive firms would export to countries with
stronger patent protection levels, as the innovative products are now more protected in
these countries. However, our results indicate that our estimated coefficient is actually bi-
ased downwards. While puzzling, it may be that other country factors (size of the market,
business environment, etc) are more dominant features than patent protection levels to
R&D intensive firms when exporting abroad.
Columns (5) and (6) present the impact of partner IPR on domestic innovation for
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either relatively open or closed industries. As expected, column (5) indicates that open
industries respond strongly to partner IPR but not domestic IPR6. Specifically, we find
that a 1% increase in partner IPR is associated with an increase in R&D intensity of 2.2%.
These results are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results in column (5) are in line with what we hypothesized. For instance, suppose
an R&D intensive firm located in a small open economy, such as Singapore, exports 90%
of its production to the U.K. It is likely that the Singaporean firms may be influenced
by changes in U.K. IPR. And crucially, since the Singaporean firms are unlikely to exert
influence on U.K. government policy, changes in U.K. IPR represent a quasi-natural exper-
iment. Hence, this strong relationship between U.K. IPR and Singaporean R&D can be
readily interpreted as causal. We would therefore expect that open industries, or industries
located in relatively open economies, would respond more to changes in partner IPR than
domestic IPR.
Conversely, for relatively closed industries, we would expect that domestic IPR would
influence domestic R&D activity more than partner IPR. This is exactly what we see in
column (6). For relatively closed industries, a 1% increase in domestic IPR is associated
with a 1.14% increase in R&D intensity. We further see that there is a statistically in-
significant relationship between partner IPR and R&D activity for industries that export
less than 50% of its production.
Therefore, the results presented here provide unique evidence on specific global factors
that can impact domestic innovation, where the level of trade openness by industry and
country also impact how firms respond to IPR. These results can potentially provide an
alternative avenue for policy-makers to promote domestic innovation.
2.3.1 Non-Linear Relationship between IPR and R&D
Previous theoretical and empirical literature has addressed the possibility that IPR and
innovation may have a non-linear relationship. For instance, papers as early as Helpman
(2003) claim that marginally stronger patent protection may in fact inhibit innovation.
Empirically, Allred and Park (2007) explore the possibility that an inverted U-relationship
6Ideally, the interaction between the trade openness variable and partner IPR would be used to test the
idea that smaller economies respond more to partner IPR. However, in doing so, the interaction and the
trade openness variable are almost perfectly correlated (a correlation coefficient of .999). Alternatively,
we used the size of the country (the population from 1987) as a proxy for the level of trade openness of a
country
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may exist between R&D intensity and IPR. They find that at lower levels of IPR, strength-
ening patent rights will results in more firm-level innovation, whereas too strong IPR might
hinder innovation, as firms cannot innovate without other technology that is patented by
competitors. The reasoning is that with further strengthening of patents, firms who choose
to innovate may now require licences for multiple patents from multiples sources, which
creates delays while also increasing firm costs. This ultimately impedes innovation. By
taking into account this possibility, the econometric model may now take the following
form:
Log(
R&D
Output
)ikt = β1IPRit+β2IPR
2
it+β3EIPRikt+β3EIPR
2
ikt+X
′
i,tΓ+ ιi+ηk +νt+ ikt
(2.4)
Table 2.4 provides the results for the above regression, where column (4) presents the
results of the fully specified model and column (5) and (6) present the results for open
and closed industries, respectively. Our results suggest that there is evidence of a non-
linear, concave relationship between export partner IPR and R&D activity. Specifically,
we find that a 1% increase in export-partner IPR is associated with an 1.4% increase in
domestic innovation. The results in this table also support the idea of diminishing returns
to strengthening domestic IPR. Column (5) further confirms our previous result suggesting
that open industries respond more to partner IPR than domestic IPR, where we also find
that there are diminishing returns to stronger partner IPR. Similarly, column (6) indicates
that closed economies respond positively to domestic IPR more than partner IPR, where
the relationship between domestic IPR and R&D is significant at the 5% level. While
we do observe a non-linear relationship between domestic IPR and R&D intensity, it is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimates: Non-Linear Relationship between IPR and R&D
Full Sample Open Industries Closed Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(IPR) 1.756∗∗∗ 3.965∗∗∗ 3.623∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.874∗ 1.086∗∗
(0.326) (0.385) (0.363) (0.296) (0.517) (0.452)
ln(IPR2) 0.185∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.0302∗ -0.064 -0.0342
(0.0381) (0.0393) (0.0378) (0.0183) (0.030) (0.023)
ln(FEIPR) 1.880∗∗ 5.685∗∗∗ 5.221∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗ 0.508
(0.869) (1.024) (0.958) (0.473) (0.990) (0.554)
ln(FEIPR2) 0.003 0.003 -0.026 -0.103∗∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.058
(0.0773) (0.104) (0.0977) (0.0414) (0.069) (0.053)
Observations 1458 1458 1458 1458 670 788
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity. Sample size consists
of 20 countries across 45 industries for the years 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
2.4 Evidence from Canadian Firms
While our results are robust for a sample size of 20 countries across 45 industries, a natural
question arises whether the impact of export-partner IPR on private sector R&D spending
are more pronounced for firms located in small, export oriented economies, such as Canada.
As our a priori suggests that the innovative activities of export-oriented firms should reflect
the IPR regime of their export market, this link may entirely depend on the organizational
structure of firms, or more importantly, the size of the firm. For instance, due to the highly
complex structure of multinational firms, where global value chains span across numerous
countries, the link between foreign IPR and domestic innovation may not be so clear. It
may be the case that smaller firms, where the R&D activities can be reasonably linked to
export products, innovate according to the level of IP protection of their foreign market.
Therefore, due to the relative simplicity of the organizational structure of small firms, we
focus our analysis to export-oriented small Canadian firms in R&D intensive industries.
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2.4.1 Dataset
To examine the impact of export partner IPR on Canadian innovation, we use the T2-
LEAP-Export Registry Database linked to the Research & Development in Canadian In-
dustry (RDCI) database. The merged dataset compiles all incorporated export-oriented
business enterprises in Canada that have also pursued R&D investments. RDCI defines
total R&D expenditure as the summation of current and capital expenditures. Current
expenditures refer to wages, salaries, and other current costs, such as contracts and services
required to carry out R&D,7 whereas capital expenditures refer to costs of land, building,
and equipment.
The database covers the years between 2000 and 2008, inclusive. The T2-LEAP-Export
Registry database covers all financial information related to the incorporated businesses,
the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) industry code of the export product, the export
country, and the value of the export. Table 2.5 for instance provides an over view of the
various industries in our sample size, aggregated at the 2 digit Harmonized System (HS)
codes8.
Table 2.5: R&D Intensive Sectors in Firm-Level Study
HS Industry
30-37 Chemicals & Allied Industries
40 Rubbers & Plastics
52-59 Textiles
64-67 Footwear/Headgear
84-85 Machinery/Electrical
90-97 Miscellaneous
To focus on the global competitiveness of Canadian small firms, we restrict our sample
to firms that have on average less than 100 employees over the sample period.
Similar to the country-industry-year index, this export-weighted IPR index (EIPR) is
constructed as the weighted average of the export partners IPR, by using the proportion of
exports for each firm, for products in each industry, country, and time period, as weights.
Or more formally, if I define Xijkt as the value of exports from firm i at time t, exporting
in industry k to j countries, where j = 1...J , we have:
7Other current costs exclude contracts for R&D
8Miscellaneous refers to medical and surgical instruments, sports equipment, and arms and ammunition
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EIPRikt =
J∑
j
Xijkt ∗ IPRjt
ΣjXijkt
(2.5)
As
∑ Xijkt
ΣjXijkt
= 1,this is simply a weighted average using the proportion of exports
as weights. Similarly, to avoid endogeniety issues, we define our fixed-trade flow EIPR
(FEIPR) index as:
FEIPRikt =
J∑
j
Xijk99 ∗ IPRjt
ΣjXijk99
(2.6)
Where the export trade flows for each firm i, exporting goods from industry k to country
j, where j = 1...J , are from the year 1999. This will ensure that changes in the index are
driven by changes in export partner IPR. As IPR move slowly over time, we use 5 year
intervals for our data set; specifically we use the years, 2000, 2005, and 2008.9
Similarly, as it is reasonable to assume that domestic R&D intensity may not respond
immediately to changes in export partners IPR, we calculate the forward averages of R&D
intensity (measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to Sales). In this case, the value
of R&D intensity for the year 2000 would represent the average R&D intensity for the
years between 2000 and 2004, inclusive. Therefore, the final dataset is comprised of 416
Canadian firms across 275 industries for the years 2000, 2005, and 2008. The unbalanced
dataset has a total of 2231 observations.
Limitations
Due to limitations of the dataset, we can only analyse the effect of Canadian-firm level
innovation to changes in their export partners’ IPR after the year 2000. As the inclusion
of the TRIPS agreement caused changes to the IPR system for WTO members in 1994,
the strengthening of patent protection is reflected in the IPR index for the years 1995 and
2000, whereas very little reforms have occurred since. For instance, of the 122 recorded
countries in the IPR index, 40 countries have had changes to IPR reforms from 2005 to
9As this dataset begins in 2000, the majority of variation in IPR from 2000 onwards were from developing
countries. Therefore, the results presented here can reasonably be interpreted as how the R&D activity of
small Canadian firms respond to the IPR of its export developing countries.
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2008, where 12 are from Latin America, 8 African economies, 8 small European countries,
4 from Asia, and 8 from South-East Asia. Of these countries, neither has been considered
one of Canada’s top ten exporting countries destinations. Therefore, there will be very
little variation across time. Any variation across time will be due to changes in IPR from
these economies.10
Furthermore, to calculate our FEIPR variable, our dataset is restricted to businesses
that have been exporting to the same subsets of countries since 1999. Our data does not
account for new international markets the business enterprises have entered after 1999, or
for new firms born after 1999, or firms that exported in 1999 and died during the our time
frame.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Design
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables
of interest. Of the 416 SMEs, they all cumulatively export to 117 countries globally.
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Canadian Firm Level Analysis: R&D Intensity and IPR
Variable Obs Mean SD
ln(R&D Intensity) 2231 -10.475 1.256
EIPR 2231 4.685 0.3838
FEIPR 2231 3.79 1.257
Table 2.7: Correlation Matrix: Dynamic Trade Partner IPR and Fixed Trade Partner IPR
EIPR FEIPR
EIPR 1
FEIPR 0.3026 1
The tables below confirm our previous concerns of the EIPR measure as biased. Specif-
ically, if we account for dynamic changes in firm-level exports, there is a larger deviation
in the variable, which these changes may not necessarily be due to the export country’s
IPR, but rather other factors (possibly unobservable) that are driving these results. For
10We therefore also had to drop firms that export exclusively to the United States, as there have not
been major US IPR reforms since 2000.
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example, changes in the foreign markets’ preferences or technical inefficiencies within the
firm may cause shifts in trade flows each year. While the former can bias our results, our
firm fixed effect model can control the latter.
To examine the relationship between partner IPR and Canadian innovation, the econo-
metric model will take the following form:11
Log(
R&D
Sales
)ikt = β0 + β1EIPRikt + ιi + ηk + νt + ikt (2.7)
Where β1 represents the degree of responsiveness of innovation to export-partner IPR, ιi
are the year dummies that pick up unobservable changes that directly affect R&D intensity
over time, ηk account for the industry specific unobservable characteristics that directly
affect R&D intensity whereas νt represents the firm fixed effects. For simpler interpretation,
a logarithmic transformation to export partner IPR is applied to equation 2.7. Table 2.8
presents the results of estimating equation 2.7 using both EIPR and FEIPR.
Column (1) represents the regression with export partner IPR only. Column (2) controls
for year fixed effects, whereas column (3) controls for year and industry fixed effects. Lastly,
column (4) is the fully specified model by controlling for year, industry, and firm fixed
effects.
We see that after controlling for year, industry, and country fixed effects, export partner
IPR has a large and significant effect on Canadian innovation. Specifically, using the EIPR
measure, we see that a 10% increase in export partner IPR represents an increase of about
8.37% in domestic innovation. This result is robust across different specification models
and significant at the 5% level. While our EIPR measure is endogenous, we focus on
our results presented in panel B. By using the FEIPR measure, we see that in the fully
specified model, the relationship between export partner IPR and domestic innovation is
significant at the 5% level. Specifically, we find that a 10% increase in the export-partner
IPR is associated with a 1% increase in Canadian innovation.12
11Typically the IPR index of Canada would be included in this model. However, according to the five
factors in which the IPR index was constructed, there has not been any major reforms to Canadian IPR.
Therefore, the effect of Canadian IPR on Canadian innovation would be absorbed by the constant β0 in
the model.
12We also explored the possibility that export-partner IPR and innovation may have a non-linear rela-
tionship. The reasoning is that with further strengthening of patents, firms may innovate around existing
patents, which increases costs and reduces the appropriation of innovation. While we still do find a positive
and statistically significant relationship between export-partner IPR and Canadian innovation, we fail to
find an inverse-U relationship between the two.
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Table 2.8: OLS Estimates: Impact of IPR on Firm-Level R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Ln(EIPR) 1.336∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ .824 .837∗∗∗
(0.503) (0.504) (0.734) (0.395)
Panel B
Ln(FEIPR) .197∗∗∗ .197∗∗∗ .160∗∗∗ .096∗∗
(0.0585) (.0585) (.0582) (.0456)
Observations 2231 2231 2231 2231
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects No No Yes Yes
Firm Effects No No No Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by firm. Sample
size consists of 416 firms across 169 industries for the
years 2000, 2005, and 2008.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
2.4.3 What Factors Are Driving These Results?
While we see that a strong patent protection score of Canadian export-partners positively
affect Canadian private sector innovation, it is still important to understand specifically
what factors are driving these results. For instance, of the five factors that creates the
weighted patent protection index, is there a subset of factors that Canadian firms tend to
respond to more? To test this idea, we similarly create an export-weighted index for each
factor that comprises the patent protection index and regress R&D intensity on each of
these factors separately. Mathematically, this can be expressed as follows:
Log(
R&D
Sales
)ikt = β0 + β1Log(FIPRikt) + ιi + ηk + νt + ikt (2.8)
Where FIPRikt represents the export-weighted index (using fixed trade flows) of one
of the following five factors in the IPR index: duration, loss of rights, enforcement, mem-
bership, and coverage. The results are presented below in Table 2.9.13
For brevity, the results presented in table 2.9 control for year, industry, and firm fixed
effects. The results presented above suggest that the enforcement mechanisms of the export
13For brevity, the results presented here reflect the export-weighted index constructed using fixed trade
flows from 1999. The results are similar when using dynamic trade flows as weights.
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimates: Factors That May Impact Firm-level R&D
Loss of Rights Enforcement Membership Coverage Duration
FIPR .078∗ .100∗∗ 2.28e-17 .0962∗∗ .0883∗∗
(0.0455) (.0449) (.197) (.0453) (.0447)
Observations 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by firm. Sample
size consists of 416 firms across 169 industries for the
years 2000, 2005, and 2008.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
country’s legal institution related to intellectual property and the vast coverage of industries
protected by patents are strong determinants of Canadian innovation. Specifically, we see
that a 10% increase in industry coverage and enforcement protection of patents lead to an
associated increase in small firm Canadian innovation by .9% and 1%, respectively.
While the duration of patents play an important role in promoting innovation, it ap-
pears that Canadian firms may not necessarily be motivated to innovate if their target
export country has entered into a new treaty agreement. Canadian firms perhaps respond
more to factors related to legal institutions, or factors that directly affect their business.
For instance, firms may be reluctant to export a technologically advanced good to target
countries with weak IP protection due to lack of judicial repercussions to alleged infringer’s.
Furthermore, as costs associated to patenting goods or processes are typically relatively
significant to small Canadian firms, it seems reasonable that small firms would be increas-
ingly sensitive to changes in these factors. The investment from small Canadian firms to
patent their export product in the target country is profit enhancing only if the export
country can legally, and credibly, commit to persecuting innovators who infringe on their
intellectual property. This explains the positive, and statistically significant, relationship
seen in the above table.
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2.5 Conclusion
Our results provide new insight on the incentive structure of private sector R&D in the
context of globalization. Particularly, we find that export market IPR is now driving
global innovation. These results support the inclusion of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) into the World Trade Mandate (WTO), while also
justifying the inclusion of the newly created highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA). It would further assist policy makers to design a more optimal national
property right regime. For instance, rather than standard IPR initiatives, tax incentives,
or programs support, it would allow for policy-makers to explore alternative channels that
promote domestic innovation.
In terms of Canadian public policy, the Canadian governments’ recent domestic ini-
tiatives to encourage innovation across Canada should consider alternative channels to
support the growth of Canadian firms. However, as close to 70% of Canadians are em-
ployed by small firms, the government must recognize that innovative Canadian firms not
only necessarily respond to Canadian IPR mandates, but rather to global IPR regimes.
These results suggest that export partner IPR should be of priority when negotiating mul-
tilateral trade agreements. Our results suggest that strengthening IPR in trade agreements
can be mutually beneficial. This is confirmed through our analysis of 20 countries across
45 industries.
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Chapter 3
Estimating the Effects of Democracy
on Economic Growth: Evidence from
an Unbalanced Panel
3.1 Introduction
The question of political institutions and its effects evokes ambiguous responses. Eco-
nomic prosperity does not necessarily coincide with democracy. More importantly, while
currently rich countries are governed by democratic institutions, the direction of causality
remains unclear. Proponents of democracy argue that its institutions have greater control
in promoting and implementing policies that stimulate economic activity.1 Conversely,
past researchers ( Przeworski et al. (2000), Barro (1999), among others) argue that human
capital based policies, which either democratic or autocratic institutions can implement,
will not only lead to economic growth, but will also lead to a more effective government.
They argue that an increase in education expenditure increases societal awareness among
its citizens, which would then expose government malfeasance. This would theoretically
lead to a more adept, capable governing body that shapes policies and social choices that
are in the country’s best interest.
Since Lipset (1959), a popular view in political economy remained that wealthier coun-
tries usually tend to be more democratic. Lipset (1959) argues that since wealth is a sign
1For instance, entering into international trade agreements or investing into human and physical capital
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of modernization, modernization would also increase a citizens demand for political partic-
ipation. This school of thought remained persistent throughout the literature in political
economy. For instance, Huntington (1991) argues that higher per capita income levels
were one of the key factors during the ‘third wave’ of democratization, whereas Londregan
and Poole (1996), through a country fixed effects model, not only finds a positive correla-
tion between income and democracy, but also finds that differing levels of income are also
correlated with regime type. Barro (1999) further contributes to this literature with his
seminal paper on the determinants of democracy. By implementing a seemingly unrelated
cross-country regression with several country specific characteristics, Barro (1999) finds
that, among other factors, countries with higher income levels tend to be more democratic.
These results are also seen by Przeworski et al. (2000), where they investigate the likeli-
hood that democracies thrive during periods of economic prosperity. They find that since
dictatorships fall for various reasons, there are income thresholds where countries are more
likely to transition towards democracy.
While other recent papers support the modernization theory (see Epstein et al. (2006),
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012), Heid et al.
(2012), and Che et al. (2013)), Acemoglu et al. (2008) refute the modernization theory
and conclude that there is no statistical relationship between income and levels of democ-
racy. Acemoglu et al. (2009) furthers this claim by arguing that transitions to and from
democracy have no effect on income. They applied several forms of country fixed effect
regressions, IV estimation methods, and double hazard models (which accommodate for
country fixed effects). Related to the literature, Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2011) find that
by applying rainfall as a source of a transitory income shock, there is a consistent nega-
tive association between rainfall and democratic institutional improvement in Sub-saharan
Africa.
While this stream of literature is still continuing to develop, this paper attempts to
contribute to the literature by examining the impact of democracy on economic growth
through the channel of differing political regime types. The premise is that political regimes
associated with more democratic features are more likely to implement welfare enhancing
policies to the masses. Specifically, if the head of state was elected into office, the incumbent
has an incentive to heed voters’ interest to stay in power. We therefore argue that the
political regime types may not necessarily be the driving force behind economic activity,
but rather it’s the complex interworking of these institutions that allow for socially optimal
policies to be implemented.
For example, supporters of democratic regimes argue that democracy provides greater
extensive property rights than its autocratic counterpart, which would lead to more eco-
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nomic stability. Theoretically, this democratic environment that promotes profit-maximizing
activity by its citizens would lead to greater economic growth. In addition, democratic sup-
porters argue that authoritarian regimes are more prone to corrupt rulers that implement
wildly inconsistent policies, which in turn, would lead to a volatile economy. However,
pro-authoritarians argue that democracies are prone to social and ethnic conflicts, whereby
autocratic regimes can suppress these conflicts while implementing coercive policies that
are necessary for economic prosperity.
While the political structure may greatly differ between democratic and non-democratic
institutions, it is important to understand the social constructs of good governance; par-
ticularly, the framework of governance that allows for these institutional equilibriums to
exist.
3.1.1 Modes of Governance
The underlying driver of governance in either a democratic or non-democratic country is
the dominance of either the formal or informal governance structure. It may be that the
underlying structure of governance only differ in the level of formal governance. Dixit
(2009) defines two forms of governance in our society: the formal governmental institution
of governance, comprised by the social and legal institutions, and its informal counterpart.
The formal institutional mode of governance is defined by its national constitution,
where the legislative assembly (or higher authority) provides statutes in accordance to
the constitution, which then the governmental agencies, such as the police, courts, and
regulatory officials, interpret and enforce these rules. Similarly, the informal institutional
modes of governance provide informal assurance that the norms of society are being fol-
lowed, where possible sanctions are enforced for violations of behavioural norms. Both
modes of governance play a special role in securing the three essential prerequisites of a
healthy functioning market economy: property right protection, contract enforcement, and
collective action.
Property Right Protection
The formal and informal modes of governance play a crucial role in protecting property
rights. If the formal governmental institutions does not provide sufficient property rights
to the public, or if the public perceives that they are not receiving adequate protection,
the public has several alternatives from either private or social institutions. In the absence
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of sufficient property right protection from the formal government, a common deterrent to
reduce property right violations are private security services and safe haven regions.
However, a private order method of reducing property right infringements has some
harmful effects. For one, it may actually increase the likelihood of property right violations
for those who either opt out or cannot afford these modes of private property protection.
This spillover effect triggers other agents in the economy to further inquire and purchase
these methods of crime deterrence, which then increases the demand for these services and
ultimately drives the prices for these services upwards. More importantly, the mechanism
that drives this loss of consumer welfare for citizens in this economy is due to the lack
of efficient formal governance. In addition, the presence of a weak economic governance
structure may deter foreign investors due to the additional costs in protecting property
rights. This additional cost would reduce the flow of foreign capital, which may hinder
further local economic activity.
While these methods of deterrence are common in all societies, these issues are more
likely to arise in developing and transitional economies, where weak governance is present.
However, the underlying issue behind a weak economic governance may be the selfish
preferences of the head of state, where their political actions may either benefit their self
serving preferences or benefit preferences of a subgroup of the population. This type of
behaviour is more commonly seen in autocratic economies. In either case, the state laws
and actual order, presented by the formal and informal modes of governance, are crucial
for a flourishing economy.
Enforcement of Contracts
The set of statutes provided by a governing body allows for its citizens to reasonably
expect that the government will effectively enforce the law. By contrast, for a function-
ing society to exist, the formal institutions of the state requires their citizens to have a
certain level of trust and believe in credible legal repercussions. Otherwise, citizens may
constantly renege on contractual obligations. If this is the case, this would deter future
economic exchanges, and hinder future economic activity. It is therefore crucial for the
governing body to sustain this social equilibrium where the selfish are punished and the
cooperators mutually benefit. However, in the absence of strong contractual protection,
citizens may view private governance methods as a viable alternative. Unlike the formal
mode of governance, private governance of contract enforcements may entail those that are
involved in nefarious activities, which through rent seeking behaviour, may deter economic
activity to occur in the long run. It is in this instance where prosocial preferences must
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be instilled by the government so as to create a situation where the predominate strategy
is to reciprocate mutually beneficial behaviour and penalize the selfish. Otherwise, selfish
behaviour leads to political and corporate corruption. Firms, political figures, and legal
agencies, may all find that the behavioural norm is to maximize their own wealth through
endowments outside of their establishments. Clearly, this can make business costly for
domestic and foreign firms.
Bureaucratic corruption also produces various negative externalities. For instance, it
may alter the selection process of choosing optimal productive government expenditures,
which in turn is detrimental to economic growth2. For successful, efficient, and productive
order to occur, these economic institutions rely heavily on altruistic behaviour from its
citizens to encourage economic activity and induce economic growth3.
Collective Action
Collective action is necessary for both property rights and enforcement of contracts. Suc-
cessful systems of collective action often involve an established group where transparent
information is provided to its members. Generally, the group provides its member in-
formation on the member list, their rights and responsibilities, and consequences of any
misbehaviours. The transparency of this information helps members to adhere to the norms
of the group. Thus, collective action provides a mechanism that disciplines members where
formal governance may not operate, or may be too troublesome to enter. For example,
social groups or industry leaders may have a comparative advantage in knowledge and ex-
pertise in a certain field that the government may find too complex to resolve. An example
of this include experts in certain fields called in to court for litigation proceedings.
While the underpinning of governance has been briefly covered, the differences between
democratic and autocratic institutions can be described by the level of (in)efficient formal
economic governance they provide to society. The consequences of these factors are a result
of the type of political institutions that are currently in place, where an eventual transition
of efficient markets is reflected in the transitions within political regimes. The following
section will extensively cover the political construct of several formal economic governance
systems, their definition, and how their divergent paths to political office are associated
with economic growth.
2Hillman et al. (2004)
3Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) argue that if corruption is costly, there is a maximizing level of corruption
that can have a positive effect on growth
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3.1.2 Classification of Regime Types
Democratic Institutions
We define democratic regimes as institutions where government offices are appointed
through a contested election. Specifically, the chief executive office and the legislative body
must be chosen by its citizens. A contested election of a democracy has three distinct fea-
tures. First, the outcome of the election must be uncertain. Second, the chosen official
ex post is irreversible; that is, the chosen official cannot be removed after the election.
Third, elections will typically take place at regular and known time periods. Given these
generalized features of democracy, sub democratic regimes differ only in the relationship
between the chief executive office and the legislative body.
In a presidential democracy, the president is separate from the legislative body, whereas
a parliamentary democracy, the chief executive, such as the prime minister, is part of the
legislative assembly. The presidential system allows for the president and the legislative
body to be elected by its citizens separately, whereas the legislature is elected by the
people and the legislative body appoint, or recommend one of its members as a chief
executive. As conflicting parties may be represented in the presidency and in the legislative
assembly, generally, amendments to current statutes or implementing new provisions may
be more difficult to enforce in a presidential system than a parliamentary system. A semi
presidential (or mixed democratic) system is a mix of both the parliamentary and the
presidential system. The chief executive officer reports to the legislative assembly but is
also elected as head of state.
Autocratic Institutions
The classifications of nondemocratic regimes in this section are based from Cheibub et al.
(2010). They argue that aside from a monarchist dictatorship, there are notable distinc-
tions between military and civilian dictatorships. Particularly, past researchers have often
grouped both sub authoritarian regimes together. While the motive for staging coups may
vary among military dictatorships, the rebellious group typically feel the need to obstruct
their country’s political agenda in a strong coercive manner, where they consider their ac-
tions beneficial to the country. Their interference in the country’s political agenda is often
justified due to their affiliation or support from the national armed forces, which typically
control their country through violence.
Unlike military dictatorships, civilian dictatorships usually have no formal affiliation
with an official organization, but rather build support through a regime party. Cheibub
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et al. (2010) refers to this regime group as an instrument that can penetrate and control
society. In essence, we define a civilian dictatorship through a process of elimination. If
there is no hereditary successor (or title of king as the head of state) and the effective
head of state is neither a current or past member of the national armed forces, then the
political institutions is deemed as a civilian dictatorship. This distinction is important for
our identification strategy in the econometric results we present in the empirical component
of this paper. While the aim of this paper is to measure the effect of democracy (applying
political regime types as instruments) on economic growth, to stay consistent with the
current literature in political economics, democratic regimes will also be grouped together
as instruments for democracy.
3.2 Literature Review
While the literature is vast in this field, there is still an ongoing debate over the economic
implications of democratization. A recent summary of the academic literature by Gerring
et al. (2005) states that “democracy has either a negative effect on GDP growth or no
overall effect”. Furthermore, a meta-analysis conducted by Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu
(2008) reveal that of the currently 84 published democracy-growth studies (with a total of
483 regression estimates), 15% of the estimates conclude there is a negative and statistically
significant association between democracy and economic growth, 21% are negative and
statistically insignificant, 27% are positive and statistically significant, while 37% of the
estimates are positive but statistically insignificant. The large variations in results are
due to several factors. Mainly, the approach on how to capture the relationship greatly
differs. Some researchers focus on physical investment, human capital, or political stability
channels for inferences, while others provide estimates on well specified structural models.
The differences in estimates are further amplified when taking into account the different
data sources, estimation methodologies, sample size, and time period. For the purpose of
this paper, we focus on previous empirical work that has captured the democracy-economic
growth relationship measured through institutional quality and political governance.
Papers as early as Helliwell (1994) studied the two-way linkage between democracy
and economic growth. By applying an augmented Solow growth model for a panel data
that consists of 125 countries between 1960-1985, the author concludes that a democratic
regime has an indirect positive effect on economic growth through investment and physical
capital, whereas the direct effect of democracy (while statistically insignificant) is found to
hinder economic growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) find that democratic regimes may
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affect economic growth, but it appears that the results may be negligible. More recently,
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) implement a difference-in-difference methodology to
capture differences in economic growth between permanent democratic economies and non
democratic economies. They found that those economies that abandoned an autocratic
institution, its annual economic growth accelerated after the transition by approximately
1%. These results are similar to Persson and Tabellini (2007), whereby they implemented
a semi-parametric difference-in-difference estimator and found that economic growth may
decrease as much as by 2% when abandoning a democratic regime.
The work by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) closely resembles our work in that it uses
annual frequency data to capture within-country effects of democracy by using similar
methods. While their methodology mitigates omitted variable bias through country fixed
and time effects, they fail to address the issue of reverse causality between economic growth
and democracy. Furthermore, they exclude standard neoclassical growth determinants as
control variables to isolate the effects of democracy on economic growth. This is typically
seen in the literature today, with other notable examples such as Aghion et al. (2007),
Glaeser et al. (2004), and more recently Acemoglu et al. (2014), where they employ OLS
models with (sometimes) fixed effect models excluding known growth determinants and
reverse causality issues. While other papers (Barro (1996), Acemoglu et al. (2008), and
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)) do address the issue of reverse causality and include known
growth determinants, their results either suffer from severe small sample bias or focus on
long term affects of democracy, while ignoring the short term effects of developing countries
transitioning towards democracy.
We attempt to contribute to this growing literature by revisiting the short run economic
effects of democratization for a subset of developing countries. Specifically, our analysis is
centred over a time period where a wave of democratization had occurred in the Asian,
Latin American, and African continents. During this time frame, the transitions towards
democracy were initially proposed to strengthen a countries inherently weak political in-
stitution by instating ‘participatory’ politics to ensure redistributive policies were enacted.
This would theoretically enhance economic activity. However, by instrumenting democ-
racy with political regimes types, in addition to including numerous control variables, our
results indicate that in the short run, developing countries that transitioned to a more
democratic state are associated with lower levels of per capita income. These results sug-
gest that over the short run, transitions towards a more democratic regime perhaps creates
more political instability, which in turn, deters economic activity.
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3.3 Model Specification and Data
3.3.1 Data
Our annual panel data consists of 43 developing countries located in Africa, Latin America,
and Asia, for the years between 1970 and 1999. Table 6 in the appendix lists the coun-
tries within each region that is included in this cross-country study. Our main democracy
measure is the Polity IV index4. The polity index captures qualities associated with demo-
cratic and autocratic authorities in governing institutions. This measure of government
institutions is comprised of the following three key features of the current elected head of
state: qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political
competition. The Polity score is on a 21 point scale, ranging from a hereditary monarchist
(-10) to a consolidated democracy (+10). For a simpler interpretation, the polity index
has been normalized from 0 to 1. Figure 3.1 below graphs the demeaned and detrended
relationship between log of real GDP per Capita and the Polity index5. This simple graph
illustrates the underlying results of this section. Particularly, we find that countries with
higher levels of democratic characteristics are correlated with lower levels of per capita in-
come. These results provide anecdotal evidence to support previous arguments that newly
democratic regimes may allow for a suboptimal amount of re-distributional policies to be
implemented6. However, to closely examine the impact of democratic regimes on economic
growth, we first need to address the issue of reverse causality.
To examine the impact of democracy on economic growth, we propose to instrument our
democracy measure with the classification of government regime types created by Cheibub
et al. (2010). Cheibub et al. (2010) classifies the head of states as the following: parlia-
mentary, mixed, and presidential democracies, or civilian, military, and royal dictatorships.
The idea to use political regime types as an instrument is quite intuitive. We argue that
the official political regime types may not necessarily matter for growth, but rather the
policies that these newly appointed political regimes can enact. Specifically, if the head of
state has high executive constraint (measured through the polity index), the elected official
has an incentive to enact more redistributive policies to satisfy their voters and remain in
4The Freedom house index was also used as a measure of democracy in this study. Table 3.1 presents
the results for the initial OLS regressions. As the polity and freedom house indices are highly correlated
(.87), results using this measure have been omitted in future findings.
5Both measures were regressed on country and time fixed effects, and the unobserved variation, the
residuals, were extracted.
6Aghion et al. (2004) find that redistributive pressures from a democracy may actually be harmful to
growth
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Figure 3.1: Log of Real per Capita Income and Democracy: Demeaned by Country Fixed
and Time Effects
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power. Therefore, these types of policies would be correlated with the democracy measure
through the executive constraint channel7.
For robustness checks, other instruments used in this model will follow the standard
analysis in the political economy literature, where sub categories of democratic (and au-
tocratic) regimes are not differentiated, and thus treated homogeneously8. We therefore
introduce the democratic regime instrument as a binary variable where its value is one
if the country is parliamentary, mixed, or a presidential democracy, and zero otherwise9.
7While the classification of regime types is arguably another measure for democracy, the instruments
used in this paper are quite mechanical in nature. For instance, while we cannot test the exclusion
restriction, we use the Hansen-J and F-statistics to test the validity and relevance of the instruments,
respectively.
8Gerring et al. (2009) argue that parliamentary systems provide good governance, and perhaps ad-
vantages over presidential systems, while Knutsen (2011) refute these claims arguing that the results
driven by Gerring et al. (2009) are based on personal power concentration in new, low quality presidential
democracies
9Democracy dummy’s have been used in growth regressions in the past, but without much success.
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) argues that a democratic indicator variable may be biased. For
instance, if regime switching is occurring when economic times are favourable, the democracy indicator
may be biased upwards capturing a positive trend, whereas if there is anticipation of a regime switch, an
increase in economic activity may be made before the political change and the indicator variable may be
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We further use lagged dummies of democracy, autocratic regime dummies, and dummy
variables for each classification of political regime types as instruments. We find that
irrespective of which instrument is used, our model produces near identical results.
To convince the reader of our instruments, figures 3 through 5 in the appendix illus-
trate the average polity score for democratic (defined by the democracy binary instrument
variable) versus non-democratic countries in each of the three continents of interests, for
each decade. To further provide transparency with the data, each graph corresponds with
a related graph indicating the amount of countries that were sampled for the polity score
average. The complementary graphs show that from 1975 to 1995, there has been a clear
shift towards democratic regimes for all regions. However, surprisingly, the average polity
score are very similar between democratic and non democratic countries within Latin
American in 1995. These results are driven by the non-democratic countries Mexico and
Paraguay, where their current head of states, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and Juan Was-
mosy of Paraguay, were affiliated with nationalistic political parties with more democratic
features. Therefore, both countries were labelled as a civilian dictatorship.
Conversely, to further illustrate the validity of the instruments used in this study, we
can also examine the changes in income levels due to differences in political institutions
between government regimes within continents. This can be seen in figures 6, 7, and 8
in the Appendix. These figures illustrate the log of real GDP over time for each type of
political institution in each continent between 1970-1999. Similarly, for transparency of
data, we also graphed the number of economies that were included in each specific regime
between 1970-1999. These figures can be seen as a zero-sum game; That is, for every
reduction in the amount of countries in a type of political regime within a continent, there
is corresponding increase in a different political regime. For instance, in Latin America,
the significant drop in military dictatorship regimes between 1977 to 1990 corresponds
to an increase in economies transitioning towards a Presidential democracy within that
same time period. While figure 6 may illustrate that a civilian dictatorship is almost a
strictly dominate regime (measured in per capita income) for Latin American economies,
the variation of this regime is almost exclusively due to Mexico. Particularly, the large jump
in log of real GDP in 1971 to 1972 was due to Ecuador switching regimes from a civilian
to a military dictatorship, leaving only Mexico in this regime from 1972-1978. Conversely,
the large drop between 1978-1980 in this regime was due to Nicaragua and El Salvador
switching into a civilian dictatorship from a military dictatorship. More importantly, we
see that over the thirty year time period, there was a natural movement transitioning away
from authoritarian regimes and moving towards presidential democracy. Despite these
biased downwards.
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movements, there is little evidence linking political regime types and per capita income
within Latin America.
Similarly, the evidence is not so clear for economies located in Africa. While we see
that royal dictatorships have one of the higher relative average income levels over time, this
variation is caused predominantly by Morocco. But also during this time period, civilian
and military dictatorships are the most popular method of government regime, where the
average log of Real GDP are both equally increasing relatively over time. While these
authoritarian regimes are more common in Africa, the work of Knutsen (2010) provides
empirical evidence that democracy increases economic growth in Africa for economies with
weak state institutions, but these returns to democracy dwindle, and perhaps disappear for
economies with high state institutions. In this paper, we find that in our sample size the
overall effect of democracy may actually hurt national income levels for African nations,
but only for nations that have a moderate level of democracy. These results are confirmed
in figure 8 in the appendix, where there may not be a particular form of government
institution that dominates, with or without biases in the sample size.
3.3.2 Empirical Design
To examine the impact of democracy on per capita income, our econometric strategy takes
the following form:
Demi,t = θInstrumenti,t + X
′
i,tΓ + νi + ηt + vi,t (3.1a)
yi,t = α + βDemi,t + X
′
i,tΓ + νi + ηt + i,t (3.1b)
Where 3.1a is the reduce form equation projecting the instruments onto the polity
index, Demi,t, and X
′
i,t represents the following standard set of time varying cross-country
growth covariates: investment, tertiary education, savings, imports, exports, population
(total population, population over 65, and teen population), war binary variable, mortality
rate, exchange rates, and unemployment rates. νi and ηt represent the country and year-
fixed effects that control for time invariant country characteristics and the global trend
of democratization during this time period. Equation 3.1b is the second stage estimation
where the dependent variable yi,t is the logarithm of Real GDP per capita of country i
at time t. The data were compiled from several resources. We merged the dataset from
Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Cheibub (2006) while extracting additional variables from the
World Development Indicators (WDI). The model will be estimated via two-stage least
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squares. While standard fixed effect regression will yield biased results, it will be presented
in the following section as a base specification model. This will provide an early indication
as to the possible relationship between democracy and economic growth.
3.4 Results and Discussion
The model proposed in equations 3.1a and 3.1b will not only be applied to the full dataset
but also to each region (Latin America, Africa, and Asia) in our dataset. For brevity, only
the covariates of interest are recorded. All standard errors are clustered by country. The
following tables present results for OLS and two-stage least squares for the full sample size.
Column (1) presents the results of a simple regression between democracy and per
capita income, whereas column (2) adds in year fixed effects and our set of control variables.
Lastly, columns (3) and (4) in table 3.1 present the fully specified model with country fixed
effects. The standard errors in column (3) are clustered by country, whereas the standard
errors in column (4) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary serial correlation
for one period. In the absence of control variables, we find that democracy is positively
correlated with per capita income. This is to be expected, as countries in our sample are
transitioning towards democracy while also becoming wealthier over time. In the absence
of year fixed effects and our control variables, our estimated coefficient in column (1)
is biased upwards. By including the numerous control variables and year fixed effects,
we find our estimated coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level. However, in the absence of country fixed effects, there may be time-invariant country
characteristics that impact both national income and democracy. For example, if a country
is rich in natural resources, this positively impacts per capita income but may negatively
impact our democracy measure, as the head of state may use coercive measures to remain
in power and extort the countries wealth for its own personal gain. In this example, if an
omitted time-invariant variable, such as a natural resource binary variable, is positively
correlated with national income but negatively correlated with democracy, the estimated
coefficient for our democracy variable will be biased downwards.
Lastly, the results of the fully specified model in column (3) find that with 95% certainty,
countries that exude democratic traits are associated with a decline in per capita income
between 12.8% and 13.4%. While the results presented in table 3.1 are all biased (due to
simultaneity issues), we find that the estimates obtained from the two stage least squared
approach provide near identical results.
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Table 3.1: OLS Estimates: Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth
OLS
Panel A
Polity 0.493∗∗ -0.179∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.100) (0.0619) (0.035)
Observations 727 727 727 727
No. Countries 43 43 43 43
Panel B
Freedom House 0.566∗∗ -0.0928 -0.128∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.107) (0.0608) (0.0342)
Observations 709 709 709 709
No. Countries 43 43 43 43
Controls No No Yes Yes
Country Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in
columns 1-3, where as Newey-West standard errors in
column 4. The control variables include gross domes-
tic savings, measured as a % GDP, tertiary education,
measured as a % of the total labor force, imports and
exports as a % of GDP, population (total population,
population over 65, and teen population), a war binary
variable, coded 1 when the country is involved in an in-
terstate war or an interstate intermediate armed conflict
(Gleditsch et al. 2002), infant mortality rate, measured
as the number of infants dying before reaching one year
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year, contempora-
neous exchange rates, measured in $ US per unit of local
currency, and total unemployment rate, measured as a %
of the total labor force that is without work but avail-
able for and seeking employment. With the exception of
the war dummy variable, all controls are from the World
Development Indicator (WDI) database.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.2 estimates the effect of democracy on per capita income by using the democracy
dummy variable and its lag of up to two years as instruments. While the instruments are
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quite mechanical in nature, Table 3.2 shows that the first stage F-statistics indicate that
the instrument is relevant. The second stage estimated suggest that more democratic
features in a countries political institution are associated with lower real per capita income
of about 9% to upwards of 20%. These results are significant at both the 1% and 10% level,
respectively. While these results seem unusually high, it may be that the average treatment
effect of the 38 countries listed in columns (2) and (3) are over estimating the democratic
effect on income levels. It may be that the low quality institutions that transitions towards
democracy are driving these results.
Table 3.2: IV Estimates: Instrumenting Polity Index with Democracy Binary Variable
Ln GDP
Instruments Democracy 1 Year Lag 2 Year Lag
First Stage Estimates
.490∗∗∗ .428∗∗∗ .341∗∗∗
( .022) (.036) (0.053)
F-Statistic 499.43 139.61 41.02
Second Stage Estimates
Polity -0.09∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.204∗
(0.034) (0.044) (0.122)
Observations 727 610 579
No. Countries 43 38 38
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country All con-
trols remain the same. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Column (1) and (2) in table 3.3 instrument democracy with the two most popular
political regimes in democracy and autocracy, respectively, whereas column (3) use all
classification of political regime types as instruments. Irrespective of the instrument used in
this model, we similarly find that the instruments are also relevant10. The results presented
here are similar to the standard OLS fixed effects model, where a more democratic political
institution is associated with a decrease in per capita income between 10% and 12%. These
results are significant at the 10% level, whereas instrumenting democracy with autocratic
10In the case of the democratic regimes as instruments, we can reject the notion at the 10% that these
instruments are valid.
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Table 3.3: IV Estimates: Instrumenting Polity Index with Political Regime Types
IV
Instruments Democratic Regimes Autocratic Regimes All
First Stage
Parliamentary Democracy .33∗∗∗ .401∗∗∗
(.063) ( .072)
Presidential Democracy .55∗∗∗ .611∗∗∗
(.053) (.046)
Civilian Dictatorship -.369∗∗∗ .179∗∗
(.035) (.091)
Military Dictatorship -.556∗∗∗
(.024)
Polity -0.116∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.124∗
(0.0678) (0.0342) (0.0663)
Observations 727 727 727
No. Countries 43 43 43
First Stage F-Stat 58.17 300.9 62.71
Hansen J-statistics 0.0893 0.177 0.160
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. All control variables remain
the same. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
regimes is statistically significant at the 1%.
As these results are capturing the relationship between democratic features of governing
bodies and per capita income, it is also important to question whether the relationship
between democracy and income differ across regions, or whether there are ‘critical levels’
of democratic characteristics that are associated with different levels of income. Tables 7,
8, and 9 located in the appendix show the results when estimating the impact of democracy
on national income for countries located in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, respectively.
The results presented in table 7 provide evidence opposing the results shown by Knutsen
(2010), where democratic transitions are negatively correlated with economic performance
in African countries. Specifically, the results imply that a democratic regime is associated
with lower levels of per capita income by as much as 40%. In Latin America, when
instrumenting democracy with autocratic regime dummy variables, we find a negative
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correlation between democracy and per capita income of about 13%. However, these
results are not robust to changes in instruments. Similarly, table 9 presents the results
for a sub sample of countries located in Asia, and find that the estimated coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
3.4.1 Non-Linear Relationship Between Democracy and Economic
Activity
While these past results are estimating the impact of democracy on per capita income lin-
early, there is a growing literature measuring the potential non-linear relationship between
the two variables. Papers by Barro (1996), Comeau (2003), and Plu¨mper and Martin
(2003) provide evidence that ‘moderate’ levels of democracy is optimal, as there is a trade
off between rent seeking governmental institutions and public support of redistribution.
They argue that transitioning away from an autocratic ruler, where the head of state use
rent seeking behaviour as its primary method to achieve political power, will surely in-
duce economic activity. However, they argue that in a pure democracy, there may be an
incentive for the government to over invest in the provision of public goods, which may
hinder economic growth. To account for this non-linearity effect between democracy and
income, tables 11 and 12 in the appendix represent simple OLS regressions of differing
levels of democracy on per capita income. For instance, column (1) in both tables divide
the polity index into quintile binary variables, where the lowest 20% in the polity are
excluded. Column (2) implements the the three-part political categorization defined by
the Polity IV project. The categorizations are autocracies, anocracies, or democracies. To
stay consistent with the previous column, the autocratic category will be excluded. Finally,
for comparison purposes, column (3) is the country fixed effects estimate, free of control
variables, to capture the correlation between democracy and per capita income.
Table 11 captures a non-linear relationship, but it may not necessarily support a strict
inverse U-shape relationship. By dividing the polity index into quintiles, our results suggest
that countries who transition towards a more moderate level of democracy (level of polity
between .4 and .6), or a high functioning democracy (a normalized polity level between .8
and 1), are associated with a reduction in real gdp per capita as high as 18% to as low as
17% than an autocratic institution would have otherwise. These results are statistically
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Furthermore, seen in column (2), we find
that at moderate levels of democracy, anocratic regimes are correlated with 13% less real
per capita income than its autocratic counterpart.
Table 12 has the same structure as the previous table, but now distinguishes the non
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linear effect by regions. Column (1) provides similar results in that moderate levels of
democracies (normalized polity score between .4 and .6), on average are associated with a
reduction of income levels in Asia and Africa by 14% and 28% less than countries within
the same region with low levels of the polity scores. These results are both statistically
significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. However, within Latin America, lower to
moderate levels of democracy (normalized polity score between .2 and .4) are correlated
with a 22% increase in real per capita income than autocratic countries within the same
region. Within this region we find mild evidence to support the inverse U-shape relationship
between democracy and economic activity.
3.4.2 Provision of Public Goods in a Democratic Regime
While these tables provide mild evidence of a nonlinear relationship between democracy and
per capita income, we can further investigate the differences in public good expenditures
between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The idea is that in non-democracies where
political influence is highly concentrated, the head of state has an incentive to transfer the
public budget primarily to politically influential groups, whereas in a democracy, a large
fraction of the population would be required to receive the direct transfer of the public
good. In order for each citizen to receive a non-negligible benefit of the public good, there
may be larger public budgets in democracies than autocracies. This is seen by Deacon
(2009), where he concludes that democratic provisions exceed autocracies by about 25-
50% for public goods in safe water, sanitation, and education. While past papers by Lott
(1998) and Lake and Baum (2001) are in accordance with the results presented in Deacon
(2009), it is only natural to investigate in our dataset whether more democratic regimes
are investing heavily in pubic goods.
To test the relationship between public goods and democracy, we can use the following
econometric model11
Public Goodi,t = α + βDemi,t + X
′
i,tΓ + νi + ηt + i,t (3.2)
Where the dependent variable Public Goodi,t in our model will be tertiary educational
attainment, gross domestic savings, infant mortality rate, and the unemployment rate for
country i at time t. The independent variable Demi,t will be measured as the normal-
ized polity index score, the normalized freedom house index, and the democracy dummy
11This proposed model should not be interpreted as causal, but rather as a modified difference in means
test.
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variable. X′i,tΓ is a set of control variables of the population (total population, the % of
population over 65, and % of teen in population), whereas νi and ηt are country and time
fixed effects, respectively. The results of the model are presented in table 3.4.
Table 3.4: OLS Estimates: Impact of Democracy on Public Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings School Mortality Unemployment
Panel A
Polity -2.612 4.528∗∗ 2.217 1.064
(2.185) (2.189) (4.232) (0.895)
Observations 728 728 728 728
Panel B
Freedom House 0.437 5.698∗∗∗ 2.729 0.322
(2.106) (1.670) (3.368) (0.684)
Observations 709 709 709 709
Panel C
Dem -0.691 3.440∗∗ 2.033 0.387
(1.363) (1.314) (2.520) (0.465)
Observations 728 728 728 728
No. Countries 43 43 43 43
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country.
Controls include only population variables (total pop-
ulation, population over 65, and teen population)
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
We should first note that the results presented in table 3.4 should not be interpreted
as causal, but rather as a modified difference in means test. For example, regardless of the
type of democratic measure we use, more democratic institutions are correlated with higher
educational attainments of about 3.4% to 5.7% than its autocratic counterparts. Similar
to a difference in means test, these results do not suggest that a democratic regime leads to
higher levels of educational attainment, but rather we observe that democratic institutions
have higher educational attainment. However, these results are consistent with Deacon
(2009), where he finds that democratic countries are correlated with 5.6% higher level of
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educational attainment than non-democratic countries.
After controlling for time invariant country specific characteristics, while statistically
insignificant, it appears that political institutions with more democratic features may be
correlated with higher unemployment and mortality rates, while having lower domestic
savings. Although our results indicate that a democracy have higher levels of educational
attainment, this section provides anecdotal evidence that democratic regimes may overin-
vest in public goods at the expense of other investments, which could possibly hinder per
capita income in the short run.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to measure the impact of democracy on economic growth by instru-
menting democracy with different classifications of political regime types. By restricting
our dataset to developing countries during a period of global democratic reform, our results
indicate that in the short run, democratic regimes from Asia, Latin America, and Africa,
are on average, associated with lower per capita income of roughly a 10% to 12%. These
results are robust across several specification models and subsets of the dataset. Further
analysis indicates that democratic regimes tend to have higher levels of educational attain-
ment. These results provide anecdotal evidence that developing economies may be heavily
investing in public goods (at perhaps the expense of more favourable social choices) in the
short run. However, as this paper is centered on a subset of developing countries with
typically weak institutional properties during a specific time period of global democratic
reform, the results from this section do not imply that a democratic process is harmful to
growth, but rather the short run implications of transitioning towards a democracy may
cause unintended consequences that hinder economic activity. For example, it may be that
developing countries will reap the benefits of the investment in human capital in the long
run rather than in the short run.
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Chapter 4
Attracting FDI in the Presence of
Political Uncertainty: A Real
Options Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The World Bank defines a foreign direct investment (FDI) as a capital investment to acquire
a long lasting management interest in a company operating in an economy other than that
of the investor. The growth of such FDI activities by multinational firms has led to a
recent revival of interest in the locational choices firms face when investing abroad. More
so, government institutions are aggressively competing to attract foreign capital in hopes
to stimulate the local economy. The benefits of job creation, technological innovation,
and arguably economic growth, are salient FDI features that policy makers consider when
crafting policies to attract foreign investment. For instance, Airbus, a prominent airline
manufacturer based in France, announced on July 2nd 2012 that they plan to invest $600
million to build and equip a new assembly line in Mobile, Alabama. This new plant, to be
constructed in 2015, would not only create thousands of new jobs in Alabama, but would
also allow for Airbus to compete directly against Boeing to service the US market. The
state of Alabama would in turn provide an array of benefits to Airbus, including but not
limited to, tax breaks and job training.
There are numerous factors which will impact a firm’s decision to undertake FDI.
Generous government incentives are clearly an important factor, but, in addition, cost
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differences due to differences in input costs, corporate tax rates, and other costs of doing
business may play an important role in determining a suitable location for a FDI. Further-
more, the political climate of the prospective host for FDI is also a consideration, with
some nations being unattractive hosts due to the potential risk of expropriation or social
instability. However, some nations with high political instability provide generous financial
incentives to combat this additional risk. For instance, Iran, during a period of political
unrest, has set aside funds exclusively to aid foreign firms to invest into the region. De-
spite their current international sanctions, in February of 2013, the sovereign wealth fund
(SWF) announced that more than $20 billion worth of funds will be allocated to selected
foreign projects to spur economic growth. These funds are set aside to provide financial
benefits ranging from loans at favourable rates, to subsidizing future infrastructure within
Iran. Moreover, the proactive approach from the Iranian government to attract FDI has
allowed for Iran to be less dependent on the oil and mining industries and focus more on
the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, where the SWF would help support projects.
The Ecuadorean president Rafael Correa has also taken a similar stance to that of Iran
in attracting FDI. Re-elected to office in February of 2013, President Correa has sought
provisions to mining laws that would make FDI more attractive to firms in the mining
sector. These changes in policies are occurring during a period where foreign investors are
in fear of nationalistic motives, which might result in future expropriations.
These recent events provide evidence of initiatives from prospective host countries to
attract multinational firms. However, the importance of institutional quality and political
stability of a host country also plays a crucial role when attracting foreign investors. The
highly cited work of Busse and Hefeker (2007) explore how the many facets of political
uncertainty impact aggregate foreign inflows. Specifically, using a cross-country empirical
model, which spans over twenty years, they find that government stability, enforcement
of contracts, and the absence of internal conflict are strong determinants in attracting
FDI. While other related papers by Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Jinjarak (2007)
provide empirical support for the importance of sovereign risk when attracting various
modes of FDI, very little attention has been given to government proposals that attract
FDI in an attempt to combat this risk. While recent papers by Chen and Funke (2011)
and Corato (2013) have proposed real option models to quantify how sensitive firms are to
institutional uncertainty and potential nationalisation risk, Danielova and Sarkar (2011)
and Sarkar (2012) are the first papers to address potential government incentive packages
in a real options setting to attract FDI. There has yet, to my knowledge, been no research
that addresses these two issues contemporaneously; that is, examining how political risk
impacts FDI and government subsidies, from the perspective of both the firm and the host
47
country.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the dynamic decision when con-
sidering FDI, where the multinational firm takes into account the uncertainties related to
costs and the political climate of the prospective host country, which are crucial in many
FDI decisions. More importantly, this paper makes a contribution to the growing literature
on vertical FDI, where there exists a gap in understanding the determinants of the vertical
investment1. Due to the rising integration of global markets through trade, there has been
an associated rise in the trade of intermediate goods. Supply chains of multinational firms
are now spanning globally. For firms that seek to internalize their cross-border produc-
tion2, there is a growing need to understand the impact of institutional uncertainty in the
prospective host country on the decision for multinational firms to invest internationally.
This paper therefore considers the impact of FDI from both the perspective of the firm
and the perspective of the potential host country.
I first begin the analysis by considering the optimal actions of the firm under various
assumptions about the nature of costs and political uncertainty. Similar to Chen and Funke
(2011), I will be applying a real options model to capture the optimal timing of a vertical
FDI. The vertical FDI will be driven by uncertain cost differentials between the home and
foreign country, while also considering the political climate of the foreign country. However,
unlike Chen and Funke (2011), I also incorporate the issue of international transfer pricing
decisions unique to multinational firms.
Transfer pricing, defined as the internal value placed on goods or services that flow
between related entities across borders, plays a crucial role for firms to strategically mini-
mize their tax liability and manipulate its total profits.3 As firms have strong incentives to
minimize their tax liability, when there are no restrictions to transfer pricing methods, or
no authorities that can effectively enforce appropriate transfer pricing methods, transfer
pricing becomes a mechanism for pure tax evasion. This behaviour in turn reduces the tax
1FDI can be broadly be categorized as either a ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ investment. A vertical foreign
investment is defined as a resource seeking investment that is driven by differences in factor costs, whereas
a horizontal FDI seeks new markets to replicate certain production processes. While the literature related
to horizontal FDI is vast, very little work has focused on the determinants of vertical FDI.
2Dunning et al. (1976) define the ‘OLI’ paradigm in a FDI framework. They discuss the three general
advantages of FDI: ownership, location, and internalization
3For example, if the corporate tax rate in the foreign country is less than the corporate tax rate from
the home country, the multinational firm has an incentive to sell goods produced within the foreign country
to the home country at a higher price to repatriate profits to the foreign country to reduce the overall tax
burden.
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base of high tax countries.
To help reduce profit-shifting behaviour from multinational firms, the OECD has pub-
lished a set of guidelines to help tax authorities and multinationals alike to reach a mutually
satisfactory agreement.(OECD (2001)). The basic idea of the guidelines is to ensure the
transfer price is in accordance with the notion of an arm’s length price, which is defined
as the ‘price two unrelated parties would reach under a competitive environment’. As gov-
ernments have given authorization for tax authorities to interfere with business operations
by adjusting aggressive transfer prices,4 which would then increase the cost of doing busi-
ness, this model also incorporates this additional cost imposed to the firm from the home
countries tax authorities. Therefore, this paper now incorporates the impact of FDI from
the perspective of the firm, the host country, and the home country.
By developing a simple model of the firm’s decision to pursue a vertical FDI, I assume
that the firm can reasonably forecast the costs in the home country, while the costs in the
prospective host country follows a simple process of geometric brownian motion (GBM).
This base case analysis provides a threshold cost level that can be derived analytically, at
which it is optimal for the firm to switch production from the home to the host country
through FDI.
The motive for the firm to switch production from the home to the host country is a
critically important assumption, as we assume that the benefits for internalizing production
through FDI outweighs the efficiency gains through outsourcing. This assumption is based
on the seminal work of Grossman and Helpman (2003). They find that while international
outsourcing is a cheaper mode of production, the contractual obligations of the supplier
through incomplete contracts may cause frictions in the relationship between the supplier
and the firm. Therefore, the cost of contractual incompleteness outweighs the benefits of
outsourcing, which would then lead to firms to internalize its production through FDI5.
In order to explore the impact of political instability, I extend the analysis where the
cost function in the prospective host country may change abruptly. This may represent
sudden changes to the business environment that positively or negatively affect the cost
of doing business in the foreign country. This basic extension would be modelled through
a jump-diffusion process. In this model I also derive the new threshold cost level that
allows for the firm to switch production towards the host country, while also determining
4OECD (2001)
5Antra`s (2003) and Ottaviano and Turrini (2007) further provide an excellent theoretical overview of
the relative profitability of FDI versus international outsourcing
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an incentive package the government can provide to the firm to help reduce this potential
risk and invest immediately into the host country.
To further generalize the risk of political instability, rather than assuming that the
cost structure may change unexpectedly, it may be the case that changes in the political
climate fluctuates over a good and bad state. For instance, suppose rare events such as
spikes in the crime rate, political corruption, or an up rise of a military coup suddenly
occur, this state would represent the regime with a high cost structure. Similarly, suppose
there is a change in the head of state where sudden positive reforms are enacted, this may
in fact decrease the costs to the firm. If these two types of states occur randomly over
time, while also reasonably expecting that these states may change randomly, then this
dynamic cost structure can be captured through a regime switching model. However, due
to the highly complex nature of the regime-switching model, I numerically solve for the
conditional threshold cost that allows for firms to optimally switch production from the
home to the host country6
As a preview to my results, I first calculate the optimal transfer price that maximizes
profits across jurisdictions. I find that the optimal transfer price is only a function of the
home and host corporate tax rates and completely independent of the costs and political
environment of the host country. Also, given the set of assumptions, I also find that
firms are more sensitive to political instability relative to the GBM case, where the model
suggests that foreign government agencies are more likely to allocate larger subsidies and
tax credits to attract foreign investors. These results are presented numerically in section
4.4.2. The results presented from this section may lend support to the recent proactive
approach of the Iranian and Ecuadorian governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed. I first review the relevant literature
related to this paper. This primarily includes results from topics in vertical FDI determi-
nants, optimal investment subsidies, and FDI decisions under uncertainty. I then derive
analytical results when political risk is absent. This includes deriving the firm profit func-
tion, its optimal investment policy, and the governments subsidy policies that ensures
immediate investment. I similarly present results when the prospective host country faces
various types of political instability, which is modelled by both a jump-diffusion and regime-
switching model, respectively. Through numerical examples, the model suggests that host
6While the regime-switching model is a generalized version of the jump diffusion model, the regime
switching model can only be solved numerically, which creates difficulties when comparing results to the
base case GBM model that is solved analytically. As the jump diffusion model has an analytical solution,
it is therefore advantageous to incorporate the results into our analysis
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countries are more likely to provide generous investment subsidies to multinational firms
in the presence of additional country risk.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Evidence Regarding the Importance of vertical FDI
The motivation for a vertical FDI was first described by Helpman (1984). He constructed
a general equilibrium model in which the locational choices of firms are associated with
cross country differences in relative factor endowments. This seminal paper argues that
multinational firms emerge as a result of differences in input costs, where the primary
motive for firms to relocate is to minimize costs. However, subsequent theoretical work by
Horstmann and Markusen (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), and Markusen and
Venables (1998) emphasize horizontal investments, as empirical firm level analysis provides
very little support for vertical investments. Such empirical papers that support horizontal
investments are Brainard (1993), Ekholm (1998), and Carr et al. (2001). These papers
have all the same premise: multinational activities are concentrated among nations that
are similar in size and relative endowments.
However, building on the foundations of Helpman (1984), Markusen et al. (1996) and
Markusen (1997) provide a more general theoretical framework, where country specific fac-
tor endowments predict where vertical or horizontal investments are more likely to occur.
For instance, the model predicts that multinational firms are to relocate production of R&D
activities where high skilled labor is cheap while relocating manufacturing facilities where
unskilled labor is cheap. This theory explains the emergence of foreign subsidiaries as a
function of the characteristics of both the host and home country. Yeaple (2003a) further
examined the complex strategies that arise for multinational firms when examining poten-
tial host countries. His model predicts that a reduction in transport costs among countries
may increase the vertical or horizontal investments in prospective countries. While the
theoretical model by Yeaple (2003a) only took into account one country as a prospective
host for FDI, Grossman et al. (2006) provides a general framework when the firms faces a
wide variety of potential hosts for FDI. The advancement in the theory of the multinational
firm has led to a growing literature that empirically tests these ideas. Carr et al. (2001)
was the first to empirically test the theory of Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997).
Carr et al. (2001) found evidence for vertical integration, which had otherwise been largely
neglected in past empirical papers.
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Yeaple (2003b) further found strong empirical evidence for vertical FDI. Yeaple (2003b)
argues that the econometric framework in past studies failed to properly capture differences
in factor intensities as determinants for production plants. More recent papers by Alfaro
and Charlton (2007) and Davies (2008) further support these claims.
With recent evidence suggesting the importance of this type of investment, there is
now a growing field within the FDI literature focusing on the type of factor endowments
which are important for vertical FDI. Braconier et al. (2005) explicitly model the effects of
differentials in labor costs as a fundamental determinant of vertical FDI. Braconier et al.
(2005) show that the volume of sales from multinationals is driven by the wage costs from
the host country. Recent papers by Bellak et al. (2008) , Fukao and Wei (2008) , and
Braunerhjelm and Thulin (2009) further contribute to the literature that labor costs play
a significant role in locational choices of multinationals. However, in spite of the strong
recent empirical support indicating the role of vertical FDI for multinational firms, very
little research has examined the determinants of vertical FDI, and more importantly, the
impact political risk may have on vertical FDI. Aizenman and Marion (2004) found that
bureaucratic quality, investment risk, and the strength of the legal system are important
determinants in attracting horizontal and vertical investments. In addition, Jinjarak (2007)
found that both types of FDI are equally sensitive to countries with low institutional
qualities.
While these aforementioned papers provide evidence about institutional uncertainty
and vertical FDI, these studies do not address the decision rule that multinational firms
face when seeking potential host countries for FDI. Specifically, it does not capture the
dynamic decision of the firm when evaluating specific uncertainties that could impact the
value of the FDI opportunity. It is in this instance where a real options approach to vertical
FDI can contribute to this growing literature.
4.2.2 Optimal Decision Making for FDI Under Uncertainty
The decision to undertake FDI fits well in the real options framework. The FDI decision
usually entails a relatively large investment, which is at least partially irreversible. More-
over, the imperfect information regarding foreign markets creates a high level of uncertainty
as to when to proceed with an FDI. Specifically, current market conditions, national reg-
ulations, and the political climate of foreign countries create much uncertainty as to the
profitability of a FDI. Furthermore, the firm views FDI as an opportunity with a relatively
flexible time schedule as to when to undertake a FDI. It is clear that the dynamic decision
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the firm’s face to pursue a FDI coincide with the stylized features of a real options model.
Therefore, the papers presented in this section focus on the optimal timing to pursue a
project.
The work of McDonald and Siegel (1986) provides the foundation for modelling the
value of a FDI opportunity. They proposed a real options model where both the project
and the investment cost are stochastic, where they then determine an optimal investment
rule to exercise the option to proceed with the FDI. However, additional complexities arise
when considering a cross-border investment, mainly the addition of foreign country risk.
Capel (1992) first tackled this idea by proposing a real options model on how to opti-
mally service a foreign market (through FDI). Her model first analysed adjustment costs
from switching between home and foreign production, with the cost savings as stochastic.
She further assumed that the drift component of the stochastic process would reasonably
reflect market growth and potential real exchange rate depreciation. She determined op-
timal timing barriers to switch between home and foreign production. She then extends
her model to add real exchange rate uncertainty. With the added complexity, she then
solves this model using stochastic dynamic programming assuming both market and real
exchange rate uncertainty follow a binomial distribution. While Capel (1992) focuses on
FDI of the ‘horizontal’ type, this paper provides intuition regarding the motivation for
firms to optimally service new markets.
Ewald and Wang (2010) explore the uncertainty of horizontal foreign investments as-
sociated with currency risk. They modelled the exchange rate between home and host
country through a mean reversion continuous time process where the value of the option
is fixed (in terms of the foreign currency). This technical paper analyses the price sen-
sitivity of the FDI option by assuming other functional forms of the stochastic process
which describes the uncertainty associated with the FDI. Through simulations, Ewald and
Wang (2010) show that a misspecified real options model can severely bias the value of the
foreign investment when exposed to currency risk.
While these past papers focus on the value to pursue a horizontal FDI by modelling un-
certainty through a real options setting, there has been very little research that explores the
political uncertainties associated with FDI, or more importantly, how political uncertain-
ties impact the opportunity to pursue a vertical FDI. Chen and Funke (2011) are the first
to address this issue, where the potential host country faces positive or negative shocks to
productivity. These productivity shocks are captured through jump processes that measure
institutional risk. While this paper lays a strong foundation on how to capture institutional
risk in a real options setting, my paper takes a completely different approach, where the
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motivation for firms to pursue a vertical FDI are due to differential in costs between home
and host country. Furthermore, this paper also explores various incentive packages that
government agencies can offer to ensure immediate inflow of foreign capital. The methods
to model government subsidies follow Sarkar (2012), where he constructs subsidies that
are large enough to ensure immediate investment. Unlike Sarkar (2012), I will be focusing
on incentive packages that could be used to combat political risk, whereas Sarkar (2012)
focused on incentive packages for an investment where the profitability follows a standard
GBM.
This paper further captures political instability both through a jump-diffusion and a
regime switching model. Similar to Chen and Funke (2011), I will assume that there may
be abrupt changes to the business environment that create either upward or downward
jumps in costs. For example, it may be that sudden spikes in crime, either through bribes
or extortion, cause an immediate rise in costs. This level of uncertainty may increase the
incidence of abrupt intervention of government officials that coercively enforce the rule of
law, which may suddenly cause a temporary downward jump in costs.
Alternatively, the dynamic cost structure may also be similarly captured through a
regime-switching process. It may be the case that changes in the political head of states
are causing internal conflicts to arise in the foreign country. Internal conflicts may lead
to a rise in the costs of production through production delays, a rigid labour supply, or
additional costs associated with private property right protection. Periods of political
unrest followed by periods of political stability can be reasonably modelled through a
regime-switching model. Therefore, this paper captures different types of institutional risk
by modelling costs through either a jump diffusion model or a regime switching model.
In the following section, we discuss a subset of real option papers that have modelled
either profitability or firm uncertainty through a regime-switching model.
Regime-Switching Uncertainty
Several papers examine the impact of switching between uncertain economic regimes on
optimal investment timing. For example, the work of Driffill et al. (2003) show the im-
portance of detecting periods of economic booms and busts on the profitability of a firm.
Driffill et al. (2003) present the dynamics of a business cycle as a two state Markov process
to study the entry and exit decisions of firms. They then calibrate the model to industry
data of US and UK firms to show the importance of business cycle conditions on the de-
cision to either enter or exit the market. They find that firms are more likely to engage
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in new activities during an economic boom, while reducing their business activities dur-
ing a recession. Guo et al. (2005) expands this model by solving a model of irreversible
investment with regime shifts. In this paper, the regime shifts reflect the dynamics of a
business cycle, with periods of prosperity (high cash flow) and decline (low business cash
flow). Given these differing states, they propose an investment policy that maximizes the
expected present value of profit, conditional on the probability of changes in regimes. The
analysis of Guo et al. (2005) provides a thorough examination of the persistence of regimes
on investment policies.
Regime-switching uncertainty is further investigated by Elliott et al. (2009), Nishide and
Nomi (2009), and Hainaut (2012). Elliott et al. (2009) model the initial investment cost as a
hidden Markov-chain process. Their results suggest that the optimal investment strategies
derived ensure more value to the firm, as the critical threshold calculated to invest into the
project increases the likelihood that the project will be exercised. Conversely, Nishide and
Nomi (2009) derives the optimal investment decision when a regime change is expected at
a predetermined future date, but there is uncertainty over what the new regime will be.
This model provides an investment policy where the profits depend on changes to national
policies that directly impact the firm investment. An example of this would be during a
presidential election, when the election date is known in advance and specific economic
policies are associated with each presidential candidate, where each economic policy has a
different impact on the firms future cash flow.
Lastly, Hainaut (2012) propose a regime-switching model to plan entry and exit strate-
gies for firms influenced by business cycles. He then incorporates the idea that once a firm
decides to commit to the investment, there is still a delay between the initial investment
and expected future cash flow. Hainaut (2012) then calibrates the model with managerial
decisions observed from the health industry.
While these past papers provide intuition on how firms may react when confronted
with various types of regime-switching uncertainty, there is yet to my knowledge, research
that explores the type of investment policies foreign governments can implement to attract
investors that face this type of risk. While Pennings (2000), Pennings (2005), and more
recently, Sarkar (2012), have focused on infrastructure and/or corporate taxation subsidies
in a real options setting, this paper aims to contribute to the FDI literature by filling the
gap between current FDI foreign policy that is attempting to combat country risk, and
optimal investment behaviour by firms.
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4.3 Model Specification
4.3.1 Assumptions
Consider a multinational firm that intends to expand internationally. Specifically, the
multinational is considering a vertical FDI, where they are seeking to relocate their pro-
duction facility to a country that can produce an intermediate good at the lowest cost.
The new manufacturing plant will produce this intermediate good that is an input to the
production of the final good in the home country. For simplicity, I assume that there
is no demand for this intermediate good in the prospective host country, and that all
intermediate goods are exported back to the home country.
As is the case in a vertical FDI, the firm is driven by differences in factor endowments
between countries. As the firm may anticipate that cross country differences in factor
costs may be quite substantial, the firm is seeking to minimize its per unit variable cost of
production by seeking a potential host of vertical FDI. I define CmF as the per unit variable
cost of the intermediate good produced in the mth foreign country, where m = 1, ...M .
I further assume that the dynamics of the per unit variable cost of the potential M host
countries take the following form:
dCmF
CmF
= αmF dt+ σ
m
F dZF (4.1)
where αmF denotes the instantaneous expected percentage change in C
m
F per unit time.
The volatility parameter σmF represent shocks that directly affect the production of the
intermediate good. This can be viewed as the various shocks to input production capacity
that allow for the variable cost to vary over time. These shocks may range from labour
supply shocks and unanticipated capital equipment adjustments or failures, to country
risk factors. Zt is the standard Brownian motion term where E(dZF ) = 0, E(dZ
2
F = dt).
Furthermore, as the fluctuations in variable cost are caused by variation in either the labor
or rental cost of capital, I can reasonably assume that the same dynamics would affect the
cost of the initial investment. For simplicity, I define the initial per unit of output fixed
investment cost into country m as a proportion of the variable cost as κmC
m
F for κm  1.
The domestic variable cost of the firm follows a more predictive pattern. For simplicity,
I assume that the firm can reasonably forecast its domestic variable cost so that the dy-
namics of the differential in costs between home and host countries are driven only by the
uncertainty of the host country. This assumption allows us to analyse both the decision
behaviour of the firm while also analysing the response function of foreign government
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officials in the presence of its country risk. Therefore, the per unit variable cost in the
domestic setting takes the following form:
dCH
CH
= αHdt (4.2)
Where αH is the expected percentage change in the variable cost for domestic pro-
duction. Thus, for a any given time period, the firm can estimate its future per unit
variable cost as Ct,H = C0,He
αH t, and calculate the present per unit variable cost as∫∞
t
Ct,He
−(r−αH)(s−t) ds, discounted at the risk-free rate r. Similarly, the discounted per
unit variable cost when production of the intermediate good occurs abroad can be repre-
sented as E
[∫∞
t
Ct,F e
−(µ−αF )(s−t) ds
]
, discounted at some risk adjusted rate µ. Therefore,
the firm has the option where if exercised, the expected payoff would be the after tax incre-
mental profit (loss) generated by the differential in its cost expenditure. By calculating the
present value of the per unit variable cost of production for both the home and the target
country, the expected incremental profit (loss) of the FDI can be expressed as follows:
F (CH , C
m
F ) = (1− τH)
[
CH
r − αH −
CmF
µ− αmF
]
− κmCmF (4.3)
Where F (CH , C
m
F ) is the expected payoff of the FDI in the mth country taxed at
the domestic rate τH . However, as the firm is considering expanding across borders into
country m, the payoff structure would need to incorporate transfer pricing techniques to
ensure that it complies with international tax guidelines (such as those presented by the
OECD).
As firms have an incentive to shift profits or income between countries to reduce its tax
expenditure,7 I address this behaviour by modelling the transfer price, P Tm, as a function
of the tax rates of both the home and host country.
Specifically, the transfer price method applied will simply be a markup to the cost of
the intermediate good, where the markup itself will be a function of the tax rates of the
7As a numerical example, suppose the firm can costlessly produce a final good in the foreign country
where the corporate tax rate in the home and foreign country are τH = 30% and τ
m
F = 10%, respectively.
Further suppose that the global price of the final good is $1. The firm has an incentive to sell the good
from its foreign production plant to the home plant at a price greater than the cost (of zero) so as to shift
the tax expenditure from the home to the foreign country. Therefore, if the foreign plant sells the final
good to the home plant for $1, the firm would only paying $.10 in taxes in the foreign country and $0 in
the home country. Had the internal price been the true production cost of zero, the multinational firm
would have paid $.30 in taxes in the home country and $0 in the foreign country.
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home and host country. According to the OECD, the most appropriate transfer pricing
method for a tangible property transaction between related companies is the Cost Plus
(CP) method (OECD (2001)). The CP method is defined as the markup added to the cost
incurred by the supplier of the tangible property, where the appropriate profit reflects the
function performed, risks assumed, assets used, and the market conditions. Therefore, for
simplicity, the markup in this paper will reflect the market conditions of the host country
(foreign tax rate) and the home tax rate (to reflect the behaviour of firms to shift profits
across jurisdictions).
For simplicity, if we assume that the foreign corporate tax rate is less than the home
countries tax rate8, so that τH > τ
m
F > 0, the transfer price of the intermediate good
flowing from country m to the home country can be modelled as:
P Tm = ϕC
m
F (4.4)
where ϕ, the markup, can be expressed as:
ϕ =
τH
τmF
ς (4.5)
for some exogenously parameter ς. As the home and foreign tax rates are given, this
model allows the firm the flexibility in pursuing an aggressive transfer price (through larger
values in ς) to minimize its tax liability.
However, from the perspective of the home country, for a relatively high domestic tax
rate, the profit shifting behaviour from firms reduce the tax base of the home country.
As tax authorities have authorization to interfere with business operations that implement
aggressive transfer prices,9 the tax authorities have the power to adjust the intra-company
transfer price to recover some of its loss tax revenue. This adjustment imposed by the
domestic tax authorities increases the cost of doing business for the firm. To incorporate
this additional business cost, suppose the firm is costlessly being audited continuously by
8This assumption can be relaxed so that τH and τ
m
F are simply greater than zero. However, for the
case that τmF > τH , the firms optimal markup would be negative, or more formally, ς
∗ < 1. This implies
that the multinational firm would sell the intermediate good back to the home country at less than the
production cost so as to minimize its total tax liability. This would be a cause for concern as the foreign
corporate tax base is now reduced. We would therefore need to incorporate the foreign tax authorities into
the model to address this issue. This additional complexity provides a very marginal contribution to the
model
9OECD (2001)
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the home government. Furthermore, suppose that the home government can impose a tax
penalty on the multinational firm if the multinational sells the intermediate good at any
value higher than the actual cost to produce the good in the foreign country.10 Specifically,
assume that the size of the penalty is proportional to the size of the mark up cost, so that
more aggressive transfer prices are associated with larger penalties.11
Therefore, the home government imposes a penalty of size
(PTm−CmF )2
µ−αmF , which is the present
value of the per unit cost of the penalty. This penalty captures the behaviour of the tax
authority, where larger transfer prices are punished more fiercely. The firms expected
payoff function represented in (4.3) now transforms to:
F (CH , C
m
F ) = (1− τH)
[
CH
r − αH −
P Tm
µ− αmF
]
+(1− τmF )
[
P Tm − CmF
µ− αmF
]
−
[
κmC
m
F +
(P Tm − CmF )2
µ− αmF
]
(4.6)
Where τmF is the foreign corporate tax rate for country m. Therefore, the per unit after
tax profit from the vertical FDI is comprised of four components. The first component
is the present value of the incremental after tax profit due to the differences between the
domestic cost of production and the transfer price of the intermediate good. The second
component measures the after tax profitability in country m due to the differential in the
per unit variable cost and the intra-company transfer price. Or more formally, the after tax
profit that can be generated when selling the intermediate good back to the parent company
at a different price than what it cost to produce. The third component is simply the initial
per unit fixed investment cost when entering country m, while the final component is the
financial penalty imposed from the home government to the firm due to any differences
between the cost of producing the good and the transfer price of the good.
Interestingly, given that ς affects the total after tax profitability of the firm while also
impacting the magnitude of the tax penalty imposed by the home government agency, the
firm can optimally choose ς∗ so as to maximize total profits. By maximizing equation 4.6
with respect to ς, we get ς∗ =
[
τH−τF
2
+ 1
]
τF
τH
. Therefore, we see that ς∗ is completely
independent of the cost uncertainties associated with country m12.
10For instance, if the corporate tax rate in home country is 30% and the foreign tax rate is 10%, for
ς > 1/3, will result in a penalty.
11This is consistent with the behaviour of tax authorities, where firms with slightly higher transfer
prices than what is deemed reasonable only receive an adjustment to pay additional taxes, whereas an
unreasonably high transfer price will lead to court proceedings.
12However, if the home government decides to impose a penalty of magnitude τH (ϕ− 1)CmF /µ− αmF , the
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The following section will now examine the value of the vertical FDI opportunity from
the perspective of both the firm and the host country. Specifically, I first examine the
firm’s optimal investment strategy to enter the host country, where then the foreign gov-
ernment can credibly provide an incentive package (either through an investment subsidy
or corporate tax credits) to ensure immediate investment from the multinational.
4.3.2 Single Regime
Value of the FDI Project
As the expected value of the vertical FDI into country m is a function of the dynamic cost
structure in both the home and host country, vertical FDI can be appealing if the the costs
in country m are relatively low or if the domestic costs are relatively high. The decision
to undertake an FDI would then depend on the ratio between the two costs.
Therefore, by defining Cm = CH/CmF as the cost ratio between home and host country m,
then the value of the FDI option can be rewritten as f(Cm) = F
1
CmF
(CH , C
m
F ). Therefore,
by defining the value of the FDI option as f(Cm), which is now a function of the cost
ratio between home and host country, then through standard contingent claims analysis
and successive differentiation, the option value must satisfy the following equation13.
σ2FC
2
m
2
fCmCm + (δF − δH)CmfCm − δFf = 0 Cm < C∗m (4.7a)
f(Cm) = (1− τH)
[
Cm
δH
− ϕ
δF
]
+(1− τF )
[
(ϕ− 1)
δF
]
−κm− (ϕ− 1)
2
δF
Cm > C
∗
m (4.7b)
Where C∗m is the threshold investment ratio trigger rate
14, σF is the volatility rate of
the asset that spans CF , and δ is the convenience yield, which represents the additional
cost savings (or revenue generated) accrued to the holder of the FDI but not the holder of
exact tax revenue lost due to the intra-company mark up cost, the government would always collect tax
revenues equal to τH
(
CH
r−αH −
CmF
µ−αmF
)
. The firms total tax expenditure would then be the domestic tax
expenditure seen in equation 4.3 in addition to the taxes paid in the foreign country. In fact, for values
where ς > τF/τH , the tax incidences of the multinational firm is increasing. Therefore, if the government
introduces this type of penalty, the firm would optimally minimize tax expenditure with ς∗ = τF/τH which
equates ϕ = 1, and the payoff function transforms to equation 4.3.
13The derivation of a similar problem to equation 4.7a can be found on page 210 in Dixit (1994)
14If the ratio between costs is above this ratio, it is optimal to exercise this option and invest into country
m
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the option of the FDI. δF (δH) is measured as the difference between µ (r), the expected
rate of return from holding the asset (or portfolio of assets) that spans CF (CH), and αF
(αH), the expected percentage rate of change of CF (CH), ie. δF = µ− α and δF = r − α.
For a solution to hold, I need δ > 0, or the firm would never exercise their option to invest
internationally.15
In the event that there are no assets or portfolios of assets that are perfectly correlated
with CmF , this problem can be resolved alternatively through the use of dynamic program-
ming. The dynamic programming approach is formulated as an optimal stopping problem,
where the firm has the option in each period to either invest immediately into the foreign
country or delay production until the following period. This optimal stopping decision can
be modelled through a Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation. The appendix provides a thor-
ough examination where under certain conditions, the contingent claims and the dynamic
programming approach provide the same analytical solution.
For the remainder of this section, for continuity and consistency purposes, unless oth-
erwise stated, I will assume that the markets are sufficiently complete, and there exists
assets or a portfolio of assets which are perfectly correlated with the dynamics of Cm.
Solution for Optimal Investment
For the ODE derived through contingent claims analysis, the general solution to 4.7a is
now:
f(Cm) = Ω1C
λ1
m + Ω2C
λ2
m (4.8)
Where Ω1 and Ω2 are constants yet to be determined and λ1 and λ2 are the roots to
the following fundamental quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2Fλ(λ− 1) + (δF − δH)λ− δF = 0 (4.9)
The value of the option must satisfy the following three conditions:
f(Cm)Cm→0 = 0 (4.10a)
15δ can also be viewed as the opportunity cost of delaying the FDI; That is, the additional flow of savings
if the firm were to relocate.
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f(C∗m) = (1− τH)
[
C∗m
δH
− ϕ
δF
]
+ (1− τF ) ϕ− 1
δF
− κm − (ϕ− 1)
2
δmF
(4.10b)
∂f
∂C∗m
=
1− τH
δH
(4.10c)
Conditions 4.10b and 4.10c are referred to the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions, respectively. Intuitively, condition 4.10a states that when the relative cost of
producing the intermediate good in country m is sufficiently high, the value of the option
to invest internationally becomes worthless. It is not in the firm’s best interest to go ahead
with the foreign investment when the costs in the foreign economy is significantly higher
than its domestic variable costs.
Condition 4.10b simply states that upon exercising the option, the firm receives the
payout presented in 4.6. In essence, the optimal time to exercise this option is only feasible
when there is a notable difference in factor costs between home and host country, measured
by the ratio Cm. The option would optimally be exercised only if the incremental profits
generated from relocating the production facility and the local after tax profits are greater
than both the per unit fixed investment cost and the financial penalty from the home
regulatory agencies. Otherwise, the firm decides to hold off the project and wait.
Lastly, condition 4.10c states that the threshold C∗m is optimally chosen so condition
4.10b holds. Condition 4.10a requires Ω2 in equation 4.8 to be zero. Thus, using conditions
4.10b and 4.10c, the optimal ratio C∗m is:
16
C∗m =
λ1
λ1 − 1
[(
κm +
(ϕ− 1)2
δmF
)
δH
1− τH +
δH
δmF
(
(1− τF )− ϕ(τH − τF )
1− τH
)]
(4.11)
where the optimal cost ratio represented in 4.11 can be interpreted as a fraction of the
fixed cost κm and the penalty cost projected by the home government, less the after tax
present value of the incremental profit generated in country m, all as a proportion of the
present value of the incremental after tax profits from the home production17. I can then
write the value of the option as:
16The optimal cost ratio expressed in equation 4.11 follows the methods presented on page 210 in Dixit
(1994)
17If the intra-company transaction price equates to the cost of producing the good in country m, we
could use the payoff structure in equation 4.3 , and the optimal cost ratio strategy would simply be
λ1
λ1−1
[
1/δmF +κm
1 − τH/δH
]
Which is a simplified version of 4.11, where the optimal strategy is the ratio of the total
per unit cost to the after tax profit of the project.
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f(C∗m) =

(
(1− τH)
[
Cm
δH
− ϕ
δF
]
+ (1− τF ) ϕ−1δF − κ−
(ϕ−1)2
δmF
)(
Cm
C∗m
)λ1
if Cm < C
∗
m
(1− τH)
[
Cm
δH
− ϕ
δF
]
+ (1− τF ) ϕ−1δF − κ−
(ϕ−1)2
δmF
if Cm ≥ C∗m
Intuitively, the option to pursue a vertical FDI is optimally constructed so that there is
a positive after tax profit on each intermediate good produced, where the after tax profits
are shared between both home and host country. Given the results of pricing this FDI
opportunity, the following section will focus on different types of incentive packages that
government agencies can provide to ensure multinational firms invest immediately.
Government Incentives and Potential Subsidy Packages
From the perspective of the government agencies, they have a keen interest in attracting
foreign investors by persuading firms with various forms of subsidies. While the government
could possibly wait for the multinational firm to invest eventually, Sarkar (2012) suggests
that government officials may want to attract foreign capital quickly due to the political
costs of high unemployment, which can be reduced through job creation by the FDI.
In addition to the benefits of job creation, technological spillovers and increased market
competition, there are also financial benefits associated with the inflow of FDI, where the
government can generate revenue through corporate taxation. Therefore, in addition to
the non-pecuniary benefits of FDI, the expected present value of the per unit tax revenue
generated by the FDI would be
τmF (P
T
m−CmF )
µ−αmF .
However, to ensure immediate investment from the multinational firm, the government
may need to offer an attractive financial incentive to ensure the firm’s optimal action is
immediate investment. One possibility is a subsidy for infrastructure and other capital
costs18. However, this form of subsidy implicitly assumes that the government has full
information on the firm’s decision to invest abroad19, where the multinational firm will
credibly commit to its investment if the government can manipulate the firm’s investment
18The Mercedes-Benz plant in Alabama was offered free land, while the Motorola plant in Quebec was
offered heavily subsidized work space in 1999.
19As the foreign government can manipulate the firm’s investment policy through subsidizing upfront
capital costs, this form of subsidy further assumes that the government can credibly commit to these
subsidies. While these assumptions may be restrictive, for simplicity purposes, it allows us to analytically
solve the size of the investment that ensures immediate investment
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policy such that Cm = C
∗
m. Therefore, if κ
∗
m is the proportion of the per unit fixed cost
that equates the critical C∗m with the current cost ratio Cm, then setting Cm = C
∗
m I have:
Cm =
λ1
λ1 − 1
[(
κ∗m +
(ϕ− 1)2
δmF
)
δH
1− τH + ϕ
δH
δF
− 1− τF
1− τH
δH
δF
(ϕ− 1)
]
(4.12)
By rearranging equation 4.12, the size of the per unit fixed investment cost which
ensures immediate investment can be found as:
κ∗m =
1− τH
δH
[
Cm
λ1 − 1
λ1
+
1− τF
1− τH
δH
δF
(ϕ− 1)− δH
δF
ϕ
]
− (ϕ− 1)
2
δmF
(4.13)
As shown by Sarkar (2012), the size of the investment subsidy can be measured as the
difference between κm and κ
∗
m. Or, if I define the subsidy as a fraction of the initial per
unit fixed investment cost, then I have:
s = 1− 1− τH
κmδH
[
Cm
λ1 − 1
λ1
+
1− τF
1− τH
δH
δF
(ϕ− 1)− δH
δF
ϕ− (ϕ− 1)
2
δmF
δH
1− τH
]
(4.14)
This form of cost subsidy can represent several types of funding that has been seen
empirically. For instance, this subsidy can be in the form of favourable loan rates to the
firm, land purchase assistance, or property tax abatements. All these types of government
incentives reduce the final cost of relocating a production facility, which can be measured
through subsidizing κ.
Tax credits are another popular policy used to attract foreign investment. There is a
large literature related to the relationship between corporate tax rates and FDI20. However,
the tax credits in this model have the same distinct features than that of the infrastructure
subsidy, where the foreign government has access to full information on the firms decision to
invest. Therefore, the size of the tax credits in this model is only a function of the optimal
investment policy by the firm. We omit the possibility that the size of the tax credits
can be influenced through foreign tax competition or other exogenous factors. While this
20Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) provide an overview on the numerous studies related to corporate taxation
and FDI. Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) conduct a meta-analysis and through several robustness checks,
conclude that tax rates play a predominant role for location decisions of FDI.
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method to model tax credits is quite restrictive, it allows for direct comparability with the
infrastructure subsidy to determine which mode is more effective in attracting FDI.
Therefore, similar to the cost subsidy, it is very straight forward to implement corpo-
rate tax credits in this model. Suppose τ ∗F is the foreign corporate tax rate that equates
the firm’s critical cost ratio, C∗m, to the current cost ratio, the investment policy can be
expressed as:
Cm =
λ1
λ1 − 1
[(
κm +
(τH/τ∗F ς)
2
δmF
)
δH
1− τH +
τH
τ ∗F
ς
δH
δF
− 1− τ
∗
F
1− τH
δH
δF
(
τH
τ ∗F
ς − 1
)]
(4.15)
The foreign government can choose a level of corporate taxation τF such that C
∗
m = Cm.
By doing so, the foreign tax rate that ensures immediate investment from a multinational
firm can be found by solving the following cubic function:
τ ∗3F + τ
∗2
F
[(
Cm
λ1 − 1
λ1
− κ δH
1− τH
)
δF (1− τH)
δH
− τHς − 2
]
+ τ ∗F [τHς(2 + τH)]− τ 2Hς2 = 0
(4.16)
The following section will now focus on the optimal investment policy of a multinational
when facing institutional uncertainty. With the additional uncertainty, government agen-
cies now need to be more aggressive in providing generous subsidies to ensure immediate
investment from firms.
4.3.3 Institutional Uncertainty
The objective of this section is to determine how institutional uncertainty distorts the
investment timing of the FDI, while also measuring the magnitude of the subsidies that
are required to ensure that firms do not divest from countries with high levels of political
uncertainty. In this section, we model institutional uncertainty through both positive and
negative jumps in costs. This can be formally represented by:
dCmF
CmF
= αmF dt+ σ
m
F dZF + (1 + φ1)dq
m
1 − (1− φ2)dqm2 (4.17)
Where dqm1 and dq
m
2 provide sudden jumps in the level of C
m
F . dq
m
1 and dq
m
2 follow a
Poisson distribution with mean arrival rates of λ1 and λ2 and a fixed jump size equal to
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φ1 and φ2, respectively. At each time interval dt, the cost function will increase (decrease)
by φ1C
m
F (φ2C
m
F ) with probability λ1dt (λ2dt). For simplicity, I assume that the all types
of institutional uncertainty shocks are completely independent, so that E(dZF , dq1) =
E(dZF , dq2) = E(dq1, dq2) = 0. This cost structure presented in equation 4.17 captures
both the potential benefits and costs when investing into a unstable country. For instance,
negative shocks that may lead to a sudden increase in the variable cost of producing the
good in country m may include sudden increase in social or political unrest, corruption,
or international trade shocks such as trade embargos or discontinuous changes in trade
policies. Wei (2000) shows empirically the negative impact of institutional uncertainty on
FDI inflows, where incidences in corruption are almost akin to an additional tax to foreign
investors. Furthermore, the recent working paper of Bekaert et al. (2013) show how political
risk of a host country reduces the net present value of FDI. Their new measure of political
risk, derived from sovereign yield spreads, provide further evidence that political instability
negatively affects the profitability of foreign investments. Therefore, it is not unreasonable
to measure political risk, corruption, or more generally, institutional uncertainty as sudden
jumps that increase costs and deter foreign investors. Conversely, sudden drops in the
cost structure of the intermediate good may be a function of technological shocks which
increases productivity, or perhaps provisions in statutes that benefit the multinational.
As is presented in Bekaert et al. (2013), I assume that all information related to the
foreign cost structure is available to the firm, so that the firm can reasonably change
its expectations on the present value of its per unit cost of producing the intermediate
good in country m. Discounting future costs at the risk adjusted rate µ, the present
value of a per unit variable cost can be represented by
∫∞
0
E(dCmF )e
−µt dt = CmF gF for
gF =
1
µ−αmf +φ2λ2−φ1λ1
. The expected payoff of a firm pursuing an FDI in a country with
political instability can be modelled as:
F (CH , CF ) = (1− τH)
[
CH
δH
− P TmgF
]
+ (1− τmF )
[
(P Tm − CmF )gF
]−κmCmF − (P Tm−CmF )2gF
(4.18)
Similarly, to ensure that the value of the FDI option is homogeneous of the first degree
in Cm, I can rewrite F (CH , C
m
F ), the value of the FDI option, as f(Cm) = F
1
CmF
(CH , C
m
F ).
Through successive differentiation, the value of the FDI option must satisfy the following
equation:21
σ2FC
2
m
2
fCmCm+(δF − δH)CmfCm+λ1 [f(1 + φ1)− f ]−λ2 [f − f(1− φ2)]−δFf = 0 Cm < C∗m
(4.19a)
21The derivation of equation 4.19a is located in the Appendix
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f(Cm) = (1− τH)
[
Cm
δH
− ϕgF
]
+(1− τF ) [(ϕ− 1)gF ]−κ−(ϕ−1)2gF Cm > C∗m (4.19b)
Where f = f(Cm). Similar to the previous section, the homogeneous part of the partial
differential equation has a general solution of the form:
f(Cm) = Ω1C
β1
m + Ω2C
β2
m (4.20)
Where Ω1 and Ω2 are constants yet to be determined and β1 and β2 are the solution to
the nonlinear equation:
1
2
σ2Fβ1(β1−1) + (δF − δH)β1 +λ1
[
(1 + φ1)
−β1 − 1]−λ2 [1− (1− φ2)−β1]− δF = 0 (4.21)
Given the additional risk due to country instability, the value of the FDI should satisfy
the following three conditions:
f(Cm)Cm→0 = 0 (4.22a)
f(C∗m) = (1− τH)
[
C∗m
δH
− ϕgF
]
+ (1− τF ) [(ϕ− 1)gF ]− κ− (ϕ− 1)2gF (4.22b)
∂f
∂C∗m
=
1− τH
δH
(4.22c)
As was the case in the previous section, conditions 4.22b and 4.22c are referred to as
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, respectively. Similarly, condition 4.22a
states that when the variable cost of producing the intermediate good in country m is
relatively high, which may be caused due to a sudden jump in the variable cost, the value
of the option to produce the intermediate good in country m is of no value. This boundary
condition now plays a much larger role in the pricing of the FDI opportunity for larger
values in φ1.
Condition 4.22b refers to the per unit after tax profit from optimally exercising the
option of the FDI. However, the present value of the per unit cost in producing the good in
countrym takes into account the infrequent positive and negative jumps in cost. Intuitively,
a large upward jump in cost of size φ1 increases the expected present value of future per
unit costs. Conversely, a large infrequent downward jump in cost of size φ2 decreases
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the expected value of future costs. This additional uncertainty in the cost structure of
producing a good internationally now affects the after tax incremental profits from the
FDI. However, the net effect of incorporating both types of jumps is ambiguous, and is
largely dependent on the size of the jumps and the frequency of the rare events that lead
to abrupt changes in the cost structure.
Finally, as condition 4.22c states that the threshold C∗m is optimally chosen, using
conditions 4.22b and 4.22c, the optimal cost ratio C∗m is now:
C∗m =
β1
β1 − 1
[(
κm + (ϕ− 1)2gF
) δH
1− τH + ϕδHgF −
1− τF
1− τH δHgF (ϕ− 1)
]
(4.23)
Where the value of the option can now be represented by:
f(C∗m) =

(
(1− τH)
[
C∗m
δH
− ϕgF
]
+ (1− τF ) [(ϕ− 1)gF ]− κ− (ϕ− 1)2gF
)(
Cm
C∗m
)λ1
if Cm < C
∗
m
(1− τH)
[
C∗m
δH
− ϕgF
]
+ (1− τF ) [(ϕ− 1)gF ]− κ− (ϕ− 1)2gF if Cm ≥ C∗m
The optimal cost ratio represented in 4.23 has the same interpretation as before. Com-
parative statics show ∂C
∗
m
∂gF
∂gF
∂λ1
> 0 and ∂C
∗
m
∂gF
∂gF
∂λ2
< 0, indicating that higher incidences in
events that cause a large upwards (downwards) spike in the cost structure shifts the trig-
ger rate C∗m upwards (downwards). In the event of a sudden negative shock which costs
increase discontinuously, the multinational firm takes into account the frequency of these
events and adjust their optimal investment policy accordingly. In this case, the cost ra-
tio trigger rate would increase, indicating that firms are only entering country m if the
gap in costs between both countries is now much greater than in the absence of this new
risk. Similarly, the fixed size of the jump φ1 and φ2 have similar interpretations, where
comparative statics show ∂C
∗
m
∂dF
∂dF
∂φ1
> 0 and ∂C
∗
m
∂dF
∂dF
∂φ2
< 0.
Potential Incentive Packages
If we assume that foreign governments cannot control its own country risk, then government
agencies can reasonably combat its own country risk by providing large enough subsidies
that compensate firms for the additional risk. By applying the same methodology as before,
κ∗m denotes the proportion of the per unit fixed cost that equates the firms investment
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threshold to the current cost ratio Cm. Through similar steps, the level of per unit fixed
investment that ensures immediate investment is:
κ∗m =
1− τH
δH
[
Cm
β1 − 1
β1
+
1− τF
1− τH δH(ϕ− 1)gF − δHϕgF
]
− (ϕ− 1)2gF (4.24)
Where the subsidy, measured as a fraction of the initial per unit fixed investment cost,
can be represented by:
s = 1− 1− τH
κmδH
[
Cm
β1 − 1
β1
+
1− τF
1− τH δH(ϕ− 1)gF − δHϕgF − (ϕ− 1)
2gF
δH
1− τH
]
(4.25)
Similarly to the infrastructure subsidy, the government chooses a level of corporate
taxation τF such that C
∗
m = Cm. By doing so, the foreign tax rate that ensures immediate
investment from a multinational firm can be found by solving the following cubic expression:
τ ∗3F + τ
∗2
F
[(
Cm
β1 − 1
β1
− κ δH
1− τH
)
δF (1− τH)
δH
− τHς − 2
]
+ τ ∗F [τHς(2 + τH)]− τ 2Hς2 = 0
(4.26)
4.3.4 Regime Uncertainty
Value of the FDI Project
In this section, I generalize the jump diffusion model so that the target country may be
affected by unobservable periods of high and low political instability, which directly affects
the cost structure of producing the intermediate good. This may include periods of political
corruption, armed conflicts, or episodes of political violence, which may increase the cost
of doing business in the potential host country. Conversely, factors such as changes in the
head of state, reforms to improve the business environment, or new government initiatives
could temporarily reduce the cost of production.
In this model, I assume that each state will have its own independent drift and volatility
rate. However, it may be the case that staged coups and political unrest may randomly rise
after unpopular policies from the head of state. To account for this, I will assume that the
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regimes can switch randomly between high and low periods of political risk. By defining
the type of governance structure, G, as low and high states of political risk, denoted by l
and h respectively, the cost structure of the foreign country can be represented by:
dCG
CG
= αGdt+ σGdZ for G ∈ {l, h} (4.27)
Equation 4.27 states that there are now two possible states in the foreign economy. The
probability of shifting from a high political risk state to a low political risk state during a
given interval dt is φdt, whereas the probability of shifting from low country risk state to
a high country risk state in a given interval dt is θdt. Assume there is an asset or portfolio
that is perfectly correlated with CG, then through standard contingent claims analysis, the
following differential equations are defined:22
1
2
σ2,hF C
2
mf
h
CmCm + (δh − δH)CmfhCm + φ
[
f l − fh]− δhfh = 0 (4.28)
1
2
σ2,lF C
2
mf
l
CmCm + (δl − δH)Cmf lCm + θ
[
fh − f l]− δlf l = 0 (4.29)
Where δG = µ − αG. To evaluate the fundamental cost of the vertical FDI, which is
simply the expected present value of the future per unit costs, the appropriate perpetuity
factor would first need to be calculated23.
The general solutions to equations 4.28 and 4.29 consist of the particular integral and
it’s respective solution to the characteristic function. In this case, the particular integral
that gives the expected present value of future costs is of the form:
FG(CGF ) = gGC
G
F for G ∈ {h, h} (4.30)
For some risk adjusted discount rate gG. By substituting equation 4.30 into both equa-
tions 4.28 and 4.29 and solving for gl and gh, the risk adjusted discount rate, conditional
on a given state is now:
gl =
δh + φ+ θ
(δh + φ)(δl + θ)− θφ (4.31a)
22The method presented in the Appendix to derive the differential equation shown in equation 4.19a can
be used to derive equations 4.28 and 4.29
23A solution to a similar regime switching investment problem is provided by Ruiz-Aliseda and Wu
(2012) and Driffill et al. (2013). Ruiz-Aliseda and Wu (2012) calculate the expected flow of profits for
periods of either growth or decline, whereas Driffill et al. (2013) models the expected cash flows due to
changes in either economic policy regimes or the competitive business climate.
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gh =
δl + θ + φ
(δh + φ)(δl + θ)− θφ (4.31b)
Thus, if the probability of transitions converge to zero in both states, then the discount
rate of the fundamental future per unit costs now collapses to 1
δ
, which was used in the
first section.
As the fundamental cost of the FDI has now been calculated, the next step is to find
the general solution to retrieve the characteristic function. The general solutions to 4.28
and 4.29 may take the form of :
fH(Cm) = ΦC
λ
m (4.32a)
fL(Cm) = ΨC
λ
m (4.32b)
By substituting these general solutions to equations 4.28 and 4.29, and eliminating Φ
and Ψ, I now have the following quartic characteristic function:[
(δh − φ)− (δh − δH)λ− 1
2
σ2
h
λ(λ− 1)
] [
(δl − θ)− (δh − δL)λ− 1
2
σ2
l
λ(λ− 1)
]
= φθ
(4.33)
As λ has four real roots(two positive and two negative), the general solution for fH(Cm) and
fL(Cm) can be rewritten as
∑4
i=1 ΦiC
λi
m and
∑4
i=1 ΨiC
λi
m , respectively. For completeness,
I will define the 4 roots to equation 4.33 as λ1 > λ2 > 0 > λ3 > λ4. Similar to the case
with only one regime, the regime switching option must satisfy the following boundary
conditions:
fGCm→0 = 0 (4.34a)
fG(C∗m) = (1− τH)
[
C∗m
δH
− ϕgG
]
+ (1− τF ) (ϕ− 1)gG − κG − (ϕ− 1)2gG (4.34b)
∂fG
∂C∗m
=
1− τH
δH
(4.34c)
By the boundary condition set in 4.34a, Φ3 , Φ4, Ψ3, and Ψ4 must equal to zero. I now
have the following system of equations:
(1− τH)
[
C∗H
δH
− ϕgh
]
+ (1− τF ) (ϕ− 1)gh−κH − (ϕ− 1)2gH = Φ3C∗λ3H + Φ4C∗λ4H (4.35a)
1− τH
δH
= (λ3)Φ3C
∗λ3−1
H + (λ4)Φ4C
∗λ4−1
H (4.35b)
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(1− τH)
[
C∗L
δH
− ϕgL
]
+ (1− τF ) (ϕ− 1)gl − κl − (ϕ− 1)2gL = Ψ3C∗λ3L + Ψ4C∗λ4L (4.35c)
1− τH
δH
= (λ3)Ψ3C
∗λ3−1
L + (λ4)Ψ4C
∗λ4−1
L (4.35d)
However, the above has 6 unknowns in a system of 4 equations. To solve this , I can
substitute the general solutions 4.32a and 4.32b into 4.28 and 4.29, and express Ψ in terms
of Φ. If I define:
P3 =
(
(δh + φ)− (δh − δH)λ3 − 12σ2
H
λ3(λ3 − 1)
)
φ
(4.36a)
P4 =
θ(
(δl + θ)− (δl − δL)λ4 − 12σ2Lλ4(λ4 − 1)
) (4.36b)
Then I can rewrite the solution as a system of 4 equations with 4 unknowns:
(1− τH)
[
C∗H
δH
− ϕgH
]
+(1− τF ) (ϕ−1)gH−κH− (ϕ−1)2gH = Φ3C∗λ3H +Φ4C∗λ4H (4.37a)
1− τH
δH
= (λ3)Φ3C
∗λ3−1
H + (λ4)Φ4C
∗λ4−1
H (4.37b)
(1− τH)
[
C∗L
δH
− ϕgL
]
+(1− τF ) (ϕ−1)gL−κL−(ϕ−1)2gL = P3Φ3C∗λ3L +P4Φ4C∗λ4L (4.37c)
1− τH
δH
= (λ3)P3Φ3C
∗λ3−1
L + (λ4)P4Φ4C
∗λ4−1
L (4.37d)
Due to the highly non-linearity in this systems of equations, for a given set of parameters
in r, ψ, θ, δH , δL, λ3, λ4, σ
2H
m and σ
2L
m , this system of four equations with four unknowns can
now be numerically solved for the optimal investment policy, conditional on regime type C∗L,
C∗H , and Φ3, and Φ4. Therefore, C
∗
L and C
∗
H , the value-maximizing threshold, represents
the optimal cost ratio between home and host country, conditional on episodes of either
low or high country risk, respectively.
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4.4 Numerical Examples
4.4.1 Optimal Investment Policy Simulations
The complexity of the regime switching model requires numerical simulations as closed-form
solutions cannot be derived. While the benchmark case and its extension, the GBM and the
jump diffusion model, do have analytical solutions, the regime-switching model results will
be presented relative to the benchmark case. Given the set of assumptions, the numerical
examples presented in this section will help us understand how institutional uncertainty
may impact both the decision to pursue a FDI and the size of the infrastructure subsidies
and tax credits to ensure immediate investment. To ensure that the results presented in
this section are robust, we perform extensive sensitivity analysis. For instance, given a
baseline set of parameters, we see how changes in the current relative costs impact the size
of the infrastructure subsidy and tax credits. The baseline parameters are shown in Table
4.1.
For simplicity, we assumed that the effective corporate tax rate of the foreign country is
20%, whereas the home corporate tax rate is at 35%. ς∗ is thus calculated at .6143, where
the optimal intra-company markup for the intermediate good 1.075. In both the base case
model and the jump diffusion model, we assume that σ2, the uncertainty associated with
the variable cost abroad, is .302. Furthermore, we assume that the per unit fixed cost, κ,
is roughly 5 times the per unit variable cost.
In terms of the jump-diffusion model, I assume that there is a possibility of a sudden
upward jump in the variable cost of 105%. I further assume that there is a possibility of a
downward jump in cost of 90%. For simplicity, I assume that the mean arrival rate for the
upward and downward jumps are .05 and .1, respectively.
Lastly, for the regime switching model, the regime with high political risk assumes the
same parameters for σ2 and δ from the base case, .32 and .04, respectively. The increase
in δ in the high political risk state can be interpreted as the net marginal convenience
yield from storing (or holding onto) the intermediate good produced abroad. In particular,
these benefits include avoiding stockouts and continuing the production processes even in
the presence of political risk. As the value chain now spans across borders, the benefits of
avoiding production delays are more valuable than before.
For periods of low political risk, the delta is the same as the home country, .01, whereas
the variance is lower at .12. The probability of transitioning from a high to low state, and
vice-versa, are chosen at .01 and .02, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Parameter Values for Simulation
Base Case Jump Diffusion Regime Switching
τf 0.2 0.2 0.2
τh 0.35 0.35 0.35
ς∗ 0.6143 0.6143 0.6143
ϕ 1.075 1.075 1.075
δf 0.04 0.04
δh 0.01 0.01 0.01
σ2 .32 .32
κ 5 5 5
φ1 1.05
φ2 0.1
λ1 0.05
λ2 0.1
φ 0.01
θ 0.02
δL 0.01
δH 0.04
σ2L .10
2
σ2H .3
2
Given these sets of parameters, table 4.2 presents the firms optimal investment policy.
Figure 9 in the Appendix illustrates the optimal investment strategy for the base case
and the jump diffusion case, whereas figure 10 illustrates the optimal investment strategy
for the regime switching case. Specifically, the optimal strategy is graphically represented
when the value of the FDI option is tangent to the basic option pay out of the FDI itself.
Table 4.2: Optimal Investment Policy Estimates for Different Specification Models
Base Case Jump Diffusion Regime Switching
High Low
C∗m 2.942 3.223 3.873 2.697
Note: Results based on the parameters shown in Table
4.1
The results from table 4.2 suggest that in the absence of modelling country risk through
a jump process, the investment policy when using the GBM model may allow for firms to
pursue FDI too early. When modeling country risk via a jump-process, figure 11 illustrates
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how sensitive the firms optimal investment policy is to changes in the magnitude of up-
wards and downward jumps. Figure 12 further confirms our intuition that an increase in
incidences of upward (downward) jumps pushes the optimal investments upwards (down-
wards). Therefore, if the frequency of upward jumps is more likely to occur over time,
our model suggests that multinational firms adjust its expectations and wait until the cost
ratio between the home and foreign country is relatively high. Conversely, if the incidences
of downward jumps tend to occur more frequently, our model intuitively shows that multi-
national firms adjust its optimal investment policy accordingly, as the firm anticipates that
costs may drop over time.
More importantly, given the dynamics of the regime switching model, our results suggest
that conditional on the regime state, the firms’ optimal investment policy greatly differ.
For example, if country m is in a high country risk regime, the real option model dictates
that the optimal investment policy is much higher than in the low political regime state.
The intuition is quite clear: The firm would like to be compensated for the additional
risk associated when investing into a risky state. By measuring political risk through a
two-state regime process, it provides multinational firms with a lower and upper bound for
its optimal investment policy.
4.4.2 Infrastructure Subsidies and Tax Credit Simulations
While the previous section examined the impact of political risk on the optimal investment
strategy of a multinational firm, this section is dedicated to measuring the impact of
political risk on the size of the subsidies given to firms. Figure 13 graphs the size of the
infrastructure subsidy for various current cost ratios for both the base case and the jump
diffusion case, whereas figure 14 shows the total cost of implementing the subsidy. As
expected, in figure 13, our model indicates that as the current cost ratio increases, the size
of the subsidy infrastructure decreases. More importantly, our model seems to indicate
that the effect of incorporating political risk in the model drives the foreign government
to provide extremely generous infrastructure subsidies to attract foreign capital, which in
turn cost significantly more than the subsidies provided in the absence of political risk.
This can be seen in figure 14, where it illustrates the cost of an infrastructure subsidy for
various current foreign costs.24
To illustrate the magnitude of the infrastructure, suppose the current cost ratio is 2.5.
In the absence of political risk, the size of the infrastructure subsidy to ensure immedi-
ate investment would be 63% of the per unit fixed investment cost. However, if we do
24For simplicity, the current domestic cost was normalized at $1.
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incorporate political risk into the analysis, the size of the infrastructure subsidy to ensure
immediate investment is now 600% of the per unit fixed cost. In this case, by incorporating
political risk in the model, it has increased infrastructure subsidies by almost a factor of
10. Figure 13 shows that the ‘political risk’ premium, measured as the difference in infras-
tructure subsidies, increases as the current cost is low and decreases when the current cost
is high.
Figure 13 also illustrates the various levels of foreign tax rates that would ensure im-
mediate investment, whereas figure 14 presents the total cost of implementing such tax
credits. While it may be surprising that for lower cost ratios the jump diffusion model
would require less tax credits than the base model, the marginal effect of tax credits to
ensure immediate investment is large. In fact, conditional on a 20% foreign corporate tax
rate, it would only require a maximum of a 10% tax credit to ensure immediate investment
from foreign investors25. More importantly, our model suggests that the cost of implement-
ing tax credits to attract immediate FDI is much less than implementing an infrastructure
subsidy. This can be seen in figure 15 in the Appendix26. Figure 15 compares the total
cost of tax credits versus infrastructure subsidies for both the GBM case and the jump
diffusion case. In either case, we find that providing infrastructure subsidy is strictly more
expensive than providing tax credits.
While the base case and the jump diffusion models do have relatively simple solutions
to estimate infrastructure subsidies to ensure immediate investment from multinationals,
the regime switching model does not provide such simple solutions. In order to examine
the impact of these subsidies in the regime switching case, we can estimate how changes in
κ, and changes in the foreign tax rate, τf , impact the optimal investment strategy of the
firm for each regime. Figure 16 graphs the relationship between changes in κ and τf on
the optimal investment policy, conditional on each regime. Consistent with our previous
results, the results suggest that as firms face higher fixed investment costs (or higher foreign
taxes), the optimal cost ratio rises. Interestingly, the optimal investment policy in the low
regime tends to be more sensitive to marginal changes in the fixed costs. This can be seen
by the negative relationship between κ and the ratio of optimal investments,
C∗H
C∗L
. This
result is primarily driven by what I refer to as the ‘fixed cost effect’ dominating the ‘low
variance effect’, where low variance of the stochastic variable typically drives the optimal
investment policy to lower threshold values, whereas larger fixed costs drive the optimal
25This is assuming the current ratio lies between 0 and 3
26the cost of the infrastructure subsidy is calculated as s∗κCmF , whereas the cost of the tax credit is
calculated as
(τmF −τ∗)CmF
δ for the base case and (τ
m
F − τ∗)CmF gF for the jump diffusion case, which is simply
the expected present value of the loss in tax revenue due to the tax credit.
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investment threshold at higher values.
These results are further seen in the second subfigure in figure 16. However, the high
state regime threshold is now more responsive to changes in foreign taxes relative to the
low state regime case. For higher foreign tax rates there is an associated lower value in ϕ,
which implicitly suggests that there are less profits to be shifted. For example, suppose
that τf = τh, then the payoff of the FDI would only rely on the stochastic changes of the
foreign variable costs. As the high-state regime also has a higher variance, the optimal
investment threshold value would be much higher than that of the lower-regime. More
importantly, as the foreign taxes converge to the home corporate tax rate, the FDI loses
additional profits from the intra-company transaction. This explains why during a high-
state regime, the firms optimal investment policy is more sensitive to changes foreign tax
rates: it loses another channel to extract profits.
4.5 Summary Remarks and Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of political risk on the locational choice of a vertical FDI.
Following a real options approach, the results from our model are consistent with empirical
findings that institutional uncertainty has a considerable negative impact on inflow FDI. I
find that in the presence of country risk, our real options model suggests that government
officials provide overly generous incentive packages in order to attract foreign investors.
Specifically, the incentive package, either through infrastructure subsidies or tax credits,
are considerably larger relative to the base case model when political risk is not present.
Furthermore, as vertical FDI is a mechanism to internalize production facilities and
stretch the supply chain across borders, I incorporate transfer pricing as a further consid-
eration when firms invest internationally. By incorporating transfer pricing into the model,
the numerical examples expressed in the previous section suggest that tax credits may be
a more suitable method to attract foreign investors, as foreign investors tend to respond
more to changes in tax credits than investment subsidies. However, these results should be
taken with caution, as our results are based on a set of rather restrictive assumptions. As
the construction of the incentive package is simply a function of the firms optimal invest-
ment policy, one can relax this assumption and create new incentive packages that take
into account other factors, such as tax competition or revenue generation through product
outsourcing. Future research can further include Nash bargaining techniques to capture
the relationship between the firm and the foreign government. These are all but a few
ideas for extensions in this field.
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APPENDIX
.1 Chapter 2
The Park (2008) patent protection index is a function of 5 equally weighted factors. Each
component within each factor is equally weighted. The 5 factors that create the index are:
1. Membership of 5 international treaties
• Paris convention and revisions
• Patent cooperation treaty
• Protection of new varieties treaty
• Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits)
• Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights
2. Coverage of industries that can patent goods or processes:
• Pharmaceuticals
• Chemicals
• Food
• Surgical Products
• Microorganisms
• Utility models
• Software
• Plant and Animal Varieties
3. Duration of Protection
• Value of 1 if 20 years, otherwise the duration of the patent (normalized as a
fraction of 20 years)
4. Enforcement Mechanisms
• Preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions
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• Contributory infringement
• Burden of proof reversal
5. Restrictions on Patent Rights
• Working requirements
• Compulsory licensing
• Revocation of patents
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Table 3: Average IPR by Income levels: 1987-2005
High IPR Upper Middle IPR Lower-Middle IPR Low IPR
Income Income Income Income
Australia 3.75 Algeria 2.66 Angola 0.63 Bangladesh 1.54
Austria 4.00 Argentina 2.50 Bolivia 2.12 Benin 2.05
Belgium 4.46 Botswana 2.37 Cameroon 2.20 Burkina Faso 2.05
Canada 3.97 Brazil 2.18 Congo 1.72 Burundi 1.95
Cyprus 2.98 Bulgaria 3.06 Cote d’Ivoire 2.11 C.A.R. 2.13
Czech Republic 3.50 Chile 3.42 Egypt 1.86 Chad 2.04
Denmark 4.28 China 2.39 El Salvador 2.65 Ethiopia 0.83
Finland 4.05 Colombia 2.24 Ghana 2.50 Haiti 2.71
France 4.30 Costa Rica 1.94 Guatemala 1.43 Kenya 2.43
Germany 4.36 Dom. Rep. 2.23 Guyana 1.17 Liberia 2.07
Greece 3.52 Ecuador 2.30 Honduras 1.98 Madagascar 1.70
Hungary 3.55 Gabon 2.20 India 1.87 Malawi 1.70
Iceland 2.68 Iran 1.91 Indonesia 1.44 Mali 2.08
Ireland 3.53 Jamaica 2.92 Iraq 2.05 Mozambique 0.76
Israel 3.29 Jordan 1.57 Mauritania 2.26 Myanmar 0.12
Italy 4.27 Lithuania 2.70 Morocco 2.23 Nepal 1.87
Japan 4.21 Malaysia 2.64 Nicaragua 1.32 Niger 2.01
Luxembourg 3.49 Mauritius 1.98 Nigeria 2.60 Rwanda 1.96
Malta 2.21 Mexico 2.27 Pakistan 1.52 Sierra Leone 2.63
Netherlands 4.37 New Guinea 1.07 Paraguay 1.81 Somalia 1.38
New Zealand 3.15 Panama 2.17 Philippines 2.97 Togo 2.05
Norway 3.65 Peru 1.96 Senegal 2.13 Uganda 2.57
Poland 3.03 Romania 3.06 Sri Lanka 2.95 Tanzania 2.35
Portugal 2.99 Russia 2.73 Sudan 2.32 Zimbabwe 2.21
Korea 3.71 South Africa 3.33 Syria 1.91
Saudi Arabia 1.81 Thailand 1.90 Ukraine 2.47
Singapore 3.17 Tunisia 2.02 Viet Nam 2.02
Slovakia 2.51 Turkey 2.61 Zambia 1.56
Spain 3.68 Uruguay 2.32
Sweden 4.17 Venezuela 2.16
Switzerland 4.04
Taiwan 2.54
UK 4.37
USA 4.80
Average 3.59 Average 2.36 Average 1.99 Average 1.88
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Table 4: Sample of Countries: R&D Study
Australia Italy
Austria Japan
Belgium Korea
Canada Norway
Denmark Portugal
Finland Singapore
France Spain
Hungary Sweden
Iceland Switzerland
Ireland United States
Table 5: Manufacturing Industry Sectors in R&D Study
Food and beverages Transport equipment n.e.c.
Textiles Refined petroleum products
Wearing apparel, fur Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc.
Leather, leather products and footwear Basic iron and steel
Wood products (excl. furniture) Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
Paper and paper products Engines & turbines (not for transport equipment)
Printing and publishing Machine tools
Coke,refined petroleum products,nuclear fuel Weapons and ammunition
Chemicals and chemical products Electric motors, generators and transformers
Rubber and plastics products Accumulators, primary cells and batteries
Non-metallic mineral products Lighting equipment and electric lamps
Basic metals Other electrical equipment n.e.c.
Fabricated metal products Electronic valves, tubes, etc.
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. TV/radio transmitters; line comm. apparatus
Office, accounting and computing machinery TV and radio receivers and associated goods
Electrical machinery and apparatus Medical, surgical and orthopaedic equipment
Radio,television and communication equipment Measuring/testing/navigating appliances,etc.
Medical, precision and optical instruments Optical instruments & photographic equipment
Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers Watches and clocks
Other transport equipment Railway/tramway locomotives & rolling stock
Special purpose machinery Aircraft and spacecraft
Building and repairing of ships and boats Furniture
Other manufacturing n.e.c.
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Figure 1: R&D Intensity and Export-Partner IPR
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(b) Fixed Trade Flows
Figure 2: R&D Intensity and Domestic IPR
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.2 Chapter 3
Table 6: Sample of Developing Countries: Democracy and Economic Growth Study
America Asia Africa
Argentina Bangladesh Algeria
Bolivia China Burkina Faso
Brazil India Botswana
Colombia Indonesia Cote d’Ivoire
Costa Rica Iran Egypt
Nicaragua Israel Ethiopia
Ecuador Jordan Mauritius
El Salvador Korea, Rep. Morocco
Guatemala Malaysia South Africa
Honduras Pakistan Tunisia
Mexico Philippines Zambia
Panama Sri Lanka Zimbabwe
Paraguay Syrian Arab Republic
Peru Thailand
Uruguay Vietnam
Venezuela
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Figure 3: Average Polity Score by Continent: 1975
(a) Avg Polity by Continent
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Figure 4: Average Polity Score by Continent: 1985
(a) Avg Polity by Continent
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Figure 5: Average Polity Score by Continent: 1995
(a) Avg Polity by Continent
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Figure 6: Per Capita Income over time by Political Regime Type: Latin America
(a) log of Real GDP
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Figure 7: Per Capita Income over time by Political Regime Type: Africa
(a) log of Real GDP
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Figure 8: Per Capita Income over time by Political Regime Type: Asia
(a) log of Real GDP
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Table 7: OLS and IV Estimation: Impact of Democracy on Per Capita Income - Africa
OLS IV
Instruments Democracy Democracy Binary Autocratic Binary All
Polity IV 0.0770 -0.417∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗
(0.198) (0.148) (0.126) (0.127) (0.135)
Observations 169 169 169 169 169
No. Countries 12 12 12 12 12
Hansen J-Statistics 0.727 0.527 0.813
First Stage F-stat 39.70 21.62 25.86 18.71
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. All control variables remain the
same. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 8: OLS and IV Estimation: Impact of Democracy on Per Capita Income - Latin
America
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Democracy Autocratic Binary
Polity -0.0677 -0.0948 -0.127∗∗
(0.0486) (0.0712) (0.0559)
Observations 309 309 309
No. Countries 16 16 16
Hansen J-Statistics 0.199
First Stage F-stat 77.29 49.62
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. All con-
trol variables remain the same. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01
90
Table 9: OLS and IV Estimation: Impact of Democracy on Per Capita Income - Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Democracy Democracy Binary Autocratic Binary All
Polity -0.0446 0.0463 0.00203 0.0455 -0.00316
(0.0622) (0.108) (0.0890) (0.103) (0.0831)
Observations 235 235 235 235 235
No. Countries 15 15 15 15 15
Hansen J-Statistics 0.200 0.951 0.413
First Stage F-stat 12.81 9.670 10.08 15.36
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. All control variables remain the same.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 10: IV Estimates: Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Instrumenting Polity
Index with Lagged Democracy Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy Democratic Regimes Autocratic Regime All
Panel A
Polity 0.0469 -0.103 0.126 -0.132∗ 0.0477 -0.121 0.121 -0.148∗∗
(0.146) (0.0784) (0.157) (0.0762) (0.117) (0.0779) (0.134) (0.0748)
Observations 2178 720 2178 720 2178 720 2178 720
First Stage F-stat 178.5 71.06 80.74 53.71 74.86 48.74 60.86 50.46
Panel B
Freedom House 0.107 -0.108 0.174 -0.123 0.0763 -0.129 0.159 -0.143∗
(0.157) (0.0887) (0.185) (0.0879) (0.118) (0.0847) (0.169) (0.0837)
Observations 2187 693 2187 693 2187 693 2187 693
First Stage F-stat 121.0 75.15 51.55 54.90 68.59 59.66 33.95 104.2
No. Countries 88 44 88 44 88 44 88 44
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 11: OLS Estimates: Non-Linear Relationship between Democracy and Economic
Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Quintile Polity OLS
Polity(.2-.4) -0.0849
(0.0600)
Polity(.4-.6) -0.188∗∗∗
(0.0644)
Polity(.6-.8) -0.0808
(0.0900)
Polity(.8-1) -0.169∗∗
(0.0725)
Polity (Anocracy) -0.134∗∗
(0.0589)
Polity (Democracy) -0.0923
(0.0766)
Polity IV -0.179∗
(0.100)
Observations 727 727 727
No. Countries 43 43 43
Controls No No No
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. Controls
refer to population (total population, population over 65,
and teen population) variables ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01
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Table 12: OLS Estimates: Non-Linear Relationship between Democracy and Economic
Growth - By Region
(1) (2) (3)
Quintile Polity OLS
Asia Polity(.2-.4) -0.256∗∗∗
(0.0949)
Asia Polity(.4-.6) -0.140∗
(0.0805)
Asia Polity(.6-.8) 0.00143
(0.151)
Asia Polity(.8-1) 0.0207
(0.211)
Africa Polity(.2-.4) 0.224
(0.133)
Africa Polity(.4-.6) -0.281∗∗∗
(0.0917)
Africa Polity(.6-.8) 0.382∗∗
(0.167)
Africa Polity(.8-1) 0.168
(0.223)
America Polity(.2-.4) 0.223∗∗
(0.107)
America Polity(.4-.6) -0.0175
(0.116)
America Polity(.6-.8) -0.196
(0.167)
America Polity(.8-1) -0.264
(0.223)
Asia Polity(Anocracy) 0.0195
(0.153)
Asia Polity(Democracy) 0.144
(0.181)
Africa Polity(Anocracy) -0.186
(0.285)
Africa Polity(Democracy) -0.496
(0.300)
America Polity(Anocracy) -0.186
(0.161)
America Polity(Democracy) -0.341∗
(0.195)
Asia Polity 0.101
(0.271)
Africa Polity -0.326
(0.414)
America Polity -0.394
(0.285)
Observations 727 727 727
No. Countries 43 43 43
Controls No No No
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country. Controls refer to population (total
population, population over 65, and teen population) variables ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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The decision for the firm to pursue an FDI can alternatively be modelled through dynamic
programming. Specifically, the Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation can be presented as
followed:
F (Cm, t) = max
{
ϕ(Cm, t), (1 + ρdt)
−1E[F (Cm + dCm, t+ dt)]|Cm
}
(38)
Where ϕ(Cm, t) is the immediate payoff (1− τH)
[
Cm,t
δH
− ϕ
δmF
]
+(1− τF ) (ϕ−1)δF −κ−
(ϕ−1)2
δmF
and the second term on the right hand side of the equation is the value of delaying the
project, discounted by the exogenous rate factor ρ. The value of delaying this investment
opportunity yields no cash flows for holding onto the investment, but rather through capital
appreciation (the additional savings when investing internationally). Thus, in this region,
the bellman equation is now:
ρF (Cm)dt = E (df(Cm)) (39)
Which states that for a specific time frame dt, the total expected return of the FDI
opportunity is equal to the expected rate of future savings when allocating into country
m. Through Ito’s lemma and simplifying equation 39 we now have the following ODE :
ϕ2σ2FC
2
m
2
FCmCm + (α
m
F − αH)CmfCm − (ρ− αH)f = 0 (40)
An issue arises in exogenously choosing ρ. If the firm discounts cash flows at the risk
free rate where ρ = r, while α = ρ− δ, then either contingent claims (as seen in equation
4.7a ) or dynamic programming (equation 40 ) provide the same analytical results.
Derivation of Jump Diffusion ODE
Given the dynamics of the foreign cost structure, through Ito’s Lemma, the differential
equation for the value of the FDI option can be represented as:
σ2FC
2
F
2
∂2F
∂C2F
+(r − δH) ∂F
∂CH
CH+(r − δF )CF ∂F
∂CF
+λ1 [F (CF (1 + φ1))− F ]−λ2[F−F [CF (1−φ2)]]−rF = 0
(41)
Where F (CH , CF ) = CFf(Cm). If we define the following set of partial differentiations:
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∂F
∂CH
= fCm
∂F
∂CF
= −CH
CF
+ f ∂
2F
∂C2F
= (CH
CF
)2 1
CF
fCm,Cm
By substituting the above partial differentiations into 41 and multiplying by 1
CF
, we
get:
σ2FC
2
m
2
fCmCm+(δF − δH)CmfCm+λ1 [f(1 + φ1)− f ]−λ2 [f − f(1− φ2)]−δFf = 0 Cm < C∗m
Which is the ODE presented in equation 4.19a, section 4.3.3.
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Figure 9: Optimal Investment Strategy: GBM and Jump Diffusion Model
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Figure 10: Optimal Investment Strategy: Regime Switching Case
(a) Low Political Risk
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis: Size of Jump and its Impact on the Optimal Investment
Strategy
(a) Upwards Jump
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Figure 12: Sensitivity Analysis: Frequency of Jumps and its Impact on the Optimal In-
vestment Strategy
(a) Upwards Jump
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Figure 13: Incentive Package to ensure Immediate Investment: Tax Credits and Infras-
tructure Subsidy
(a) Infrastructure Subsidy
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Figure 14: Per Unit Cost Of Subsidies and Tax Credits
(a) Infrastructure Subsidy Cost
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Figure 15: Infrastructure Versus Tax Credit
(a) Base Case
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Figure 16: Impact of Infrastructure Subsidies and Tax Credits on Optimal Investment
Strategy: Regime-Switching Case
(a) Infrastructure Subsidy
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